Roots of the Recent Recoveries: Labor Reforms or Private Sector Forces? by Fitoussi, Jean-Paul et al.
Roots of the Recent Recoveries: Labor Reforms or
Private Sector Forces?
Jean-Paul Fitoussi, David Jestaz, Edmund S Phelps, Gylfi Zoega
To cite this version:
Jean-Paul Fitoussi, David Jestaz, Edmund S Phelps, Gylfi Zoega. Roots of the Recent Re-
coveries: Labor Reforms or Private Sector Forces?. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,
Brookings Institution Press, 2000, pp.237-311. <hal-01011185>
HAL Id: hal-01011185
https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01011185
Submitted on 23 Jun 2014
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Roots of the Recent Recoveries:
Labor Reforms or 
Private Sector Forces?
FROM THE MID-1970s to the mid-1980s, most of the industrial economies
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
suffered a sharp slide in economic activity, as measured both by employ-
ment in relation to the labor force and by male labor force participation
in relation to the working-age population. This decline sparked new struc-
turalist modeling of the determinants of employment and supplied an
empirical record for testing the models. Some consensus has now emerged
on the main mechanisms and causal forces behind the deep slump.1
In the 1990s, however, structural recovery became evident in many
OECD countries. Structural unemployment in Ireland, the Netherlands, and
the United Kingdom appears to have improved in the first half of the 1990s
and again in the second half. Australia, Canada, Denmark, New Zealand,
Spain, and the United States showed structural gains in the second half. 2
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1. A convergence of views among several scholars on the role played by a small set of
macroeconomic forces and institutions is evident in the recent symposium on unemployment
in the Economic Journal. See Nickell (1998), Phelps and Zoega (1998), and Madsen (1998).
2. The United States, however, failed to achieve full recovery, since a fixed-weight index
of the unemployment rates in the four educational groups is still short of its 1965 and 1970
levels.
Finland, Norway, and Sweden have begun to rebound from the loss of
export markets and banking crises early in the 1990s. For the other OECD
members, any recovery during the 1990s was too little and too late to make
much difference in their record for the decade as a whole. Austria, France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, and Switzerland actually suffered net setbacks over
the decade, and Belgium and Portugal made scant progress.
In searching for the principal causes of the great slump—the shift of
equilibrium unemployment rates onto higher paths in the 1980s—
researchers had some idea where to look. Unemployment rates in the
OECD countries had risen roughly in unison from the mid-1970s to the
mid-1980s—any deviations were mostly in the timing. Thus all the favored
candidates to explain the phenomenon were OECD-wide shocks. Models of
the equilibrium employment path set out by Edmund Phelps, with their
emphasis on the profitability of business assets and the reward to work rel-
ative to workers’ other support, pointed to five common shocks during that
period.3 The first, emerging in the 1970s, was reduced expectations of pro-
ductivity growth leading to increases in the effective cost of capital. The
second, in the early 1980s, was an increase in the expected world real rate
of interest, which likewise raised the effective cost of capital. The third
was increases in income and services from workers’ private assets. The
fourth was increases in benefits from social entitlements relative to after-tax
wage levels, resulting from the 1970s productivity slowdown and from the
growth of the welfare state in the 1960s and 1970s. The fifth shock was
the hikes in the world real price of oil during the 1970s.4 A model by
Richard Layard, Richard Jackman, and Stephen Nickell pointed to an
important role for new or expanded institutions in the postwar era, espe-
cially in Europe, such as unemployment insurance benefits and job protec-
tions, which heightened the sensitivity of unemployment to shocks.5
Accounting for the selective and uneven recoveries that began in the
1990s is a different sort of problem. Did the recovering countries experi-
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3. Phelps (1994).
4. Phelps (1994) and Phelps and Zoega (1996) found econometric support for the impor-
tance of these forces. Further evidence supporting the effect of changes in real interest rates,
productivity growth rates, or both can be found in Blanchard (1997), Blanchard and Wolfers
(2000), Elmeskov, Martin, and Scarpetta (1998), Nickell and Layard (1999), and Phelps and
Zoega (1998). Recent evidence confirming the role of wealth can be found in Phelps and
Zoega (1998).
5. Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991).
ence some shock or other development that the nonrecovering countries
did not? Or was there an OECD-wide shock or trend that powered recov-
ery in some economies but was somehow blocked from doing so in the
nonrecovering economies? In either case, do the causal forces and mech-
anisms fall within the compass of existing theory, and can they be accom-
modated by existing models?
The first hypotheses to be examined in this paper credit progress in the
recovering countries to their adoption of structural reforms and blame the
continued stagnation elsewhere to a failure to enact similar programs.
One such hypothesis, developed by Nickell and the OECD Secretariat,
points to reforms in labor policy by several OECD members. In this thesis,
anti-market labor policies sowed the seeds of the huge rise in unemploy-
ment in Europe, and the remedy lies in reversing those policies. The chief
areas for reform in this view are unemployment insurance benefits, which
are often generous and of long duration; the high density and wide cover-
age of unions in wage setting; and employment protection laws that
lengthen the average wait of an unemployed worker for a job.6
Of course, good economic policy is crucial for good economic perfor-
mance. Yet it may be that these particular reforms had little or no effect.
Perhaps planting more deeply the institutions of capitalism, or instituting
or expanding employment subsidies for those earning low wages, would
be vastly more effective in reducing unemployment (even if such reforms
are more costly in other dimensions). Europeans who value their welfare
state protections want to know whether the reduction in unemployment
obtained by scaling these protections back is sufficient compensation for
the loss of security.
The second part of the paper examines some hypotheses that invoke
monetary factors to explain cross-country differences in employment per-
formance. These hypotheses deviate to varying degrees from the non-
monetary approach of the structuralist models. We first test the thesis of
Jean-Paul Fitoussi and others that tight money in France, Italy, and cer-
tain other candidates for European Monetary Union (EMU) operated in the
1990s, or at least the middle years of the decade, to depress employment
6. See Nickell and Layard (1999), Elmeskov, Martin, and Scarpetta (1998), and OECD
Economic Outlook, June 1999. Union density is the proportion of the work force union-
ized, and union coverage the proportion to which union wages apply.
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far below its structural equilibrium path.7 This is related to Laurence Ball’s
more radical thesis that prolonged monetary tightness in some OECD
economies in the early or mid-1990s produced a hysteresis effect, leaving
today’s equilibrium unemployment path on a higher track than it would
otherwise be on.8
One conspicuous shock has been rather widespread in the OECD
economies, namely, the sensational rise of share prices and market capi-
talization on most organized stock exchanges from New York to Helsinki.
Much of this surge has been fueled, it appears, by high expectations about
future profits from the new information technologies—in short, the 
new economy. That a rise in firms’ valuation of the business assets in
which they invest—employees, customers, and various kinds of tangible
capital—would generally boost the equilibrium path of employment was a
clear implication of Phelps’s theoretical framework. And arguably, the rise
in firms’ market capitalization reflects a rise in the value their managers
place on investing in such assets, present or future—or, vice versa, a rise in
market capitalization induces managers to raise the value they assign to
investing in such assets. A loose relationship in U.S. data between share
prices and employment growth has given some empirical support to this
argument.9
The last part of this paper will try to gauge the strength of the average
relationship between stock market valuations and employment growth in
the OECD countries. It will then proceed to investigate whether disparities
in the size of the stock market boom from country to country are broadly
consistent with the selectivity, unevenness, and timing of the recent recov-
eries. It is worth trying to determine whether the economies that have not
yet recovered have had a smaller rise in their stock markets, properly mea-
sured, or whether some factors have blocked or delayed them from
responding to their stock market rise to the same degree as the average
OECD country.
The first section of the paper introduces our framework. A necessary
exercise here is to verify that not all the recent recoveries (and failures to
recover) are well explained by the garden-variety market forces on which
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7. Fitoussi (1998). Of course, the contention of some that regular and equal-sized deval-
uations would have kept employment bounded above its equilibrium path is radically
counter to the structuralist view.
8. Ball (1999).
9. Phelps (1999).
we have previously placed our emphasis. These include the world real
rate of interest, national productivity growth rates, and the after-tax reward
to work relative to workers’ nonwage support, such as the imputed income
from durable goods that workers own and the social benefits that they or
their relatives receive.
Two Baseline Unemployment Equations
Our past empirical tests of these structuralist ideas have viewed macro-
economic forces as acting upon the valuations of various business assets in
two ways. The first is through the cost of capital. The second is through 
the profits on business assets and thus possibly through expected future
profits.
In the models, the long-term gross cost of capital is the domestic long-
term expected real interest rate. The correct measure, as first emphasized
by Christopher Pissarides, is the gross cost net of the expected long-term
growth rate, g, of the productivity of labor.10 In our model, the reciprocal
of this (net) cost of capital is a reasonable trial proxy for the shadow price
of a trained employee and of other business assets, given the “level” from
which the expected stream of profits from such an asset starts.11
For econometric purposes, our measure of the gross cost of capital is an
external measure, the average long-term real interest rate in the Group of
Seven (G-7) countries. This rate is dubbed the world real interest rate and
denoted r*.12 Figure A1 in appendix A juxtaposes the path of the net cost
of capital, r* – g, against the path of the unemployment rate for each of the
G-7 countries except Japan. The increases in this variable between the
10. The argument by Pissarides (1990) that the expected g enters into the capitalization
of business assets was used in some theoretical exercises by Phelps (1994). Our empirical
work began using the world real interest rate r* without g, but we brought g in upon realiz-
ing the importance of the productivity slowdown for understanding the slump, especially on
the Continent. See Hoon and Phelps (1997).
11. The reciprocal gives the present discounted value of a stream of profits that starts at
one and grows at a constant rate g. If each trained employee produced that stream of gross
profit, after deducting the interest on fixed capital and customers he or she will have to work
with (given the current cost of capital), that reciprocal would indeed be the market value of
such an employee.
12. This rate is the average of the real long-term interest rate calculated from the yield on
ten-year government bonds and the rate of price inflation in the following four quarters. 
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early 1970s and the mid-1980s were huge in every country, although not
equal and synchronous, and preceded large increases in the national unem-
ployment rate. It is thus plausible that the slowdowns in labor productiv-
ity and the elevation of world interest rates (figure A2 in appendix A)
played a major role in the rise of unemployment to its 1980s peak.
One can also see, in many OECD economies, a major turnaround in this
variable in recent years, owing to higher domestic productivity growth as
well as a somewhat lower r*. Improved productivity performance in the
1990s may account for some part of the recovery under way in many of the
OECD economies. Tables A1 and A2 in appendix A show the changes
from period to period in the average rate of growth of the (Hodrick-
Prescott-smoothed) productivity of labor, defined as GDP per person
employed. The productivity growth slowdown in the 1970s is evident in all
of the countries except Norway. 
Yet the recent productivity speedup is very selective. Among the coun-
tries that experienced a marked reduction in unemployment in the 1990s,
Australia, Denmark, Ireland, and New Zealand have also enjoyed a recov-
ery in the rate of productivity growth. So has the United States when
productivity is calculated from the recent GDP data revision (tables A1
and A2 are based on the unrevised data). The main exceptions are the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, which, although strongly recover-
ing, do not show a marked productivity speedup. So, although surely no
single causal variable would vary from country to country so as to fully
account for the diverse experience of the OECD countries in the past
decade, improvements in employment and in productivity growth have
tended to coincide. 
These differing evolutions of productivity growth—and hence in the net
cost of capital—across countries are significant. To illustrate, we com-
pare data for one of the clearest success stories, Ireland, with those for
Italy, where unemployment has been persistently high. In both countries
the spectacular rise in the cost of capital in the late 1970s or early 1980s
preceded a long climb of the unemployment rate (figure 1). In Ireland,
however, the recovery of the cost of capital to levels of the 1960s and early
1970s was followed by a good recovery of employment, whereas the
partial recovery of capital costs in Italy led to little or no employment
recovery there.
The association between unemployment rates and the cost of capital
apparent in figure 1 is consistent with our theoretical framework. Such an
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apparent association may be compatible with alternative models, but we
believe that the strength of this association is a feature that any model of
unemployment has to take into account.
Clearly the cost of capital is not by itself a sufficient explanatory vari-
able. The value placed upon a trained employee and upon the other assets
of a business depends on the “level” from which the expected stream of
profits from such an asset starts, not just on the net cost of capital used to
value that stream. Therefore we require, alongside the cost of capital, one
or more explanatory variables that impact on profitability through their
influence on the zero-profit curve or the wage curve. 
One such variable in our models is workers’ income or services from
wealth, both private and social, relative to the reward to their work. The
income from social wealth, yS, includes social insurance and social assis-
tance benefits; the income and services from private wealth, yW, include 
not only the income from stocks and bonds issued by domestic firms but
also that from holdings of domestic public debt and net overseas assets as
well as the services of consumer durables. An increase in such income
and services would increase quitting (and shirking and absenteeism) at any
given unemployment rate, which would add to unit costs of production and
thus reduce the valuation of employees. This in turn would slow firms’
2
0
–2
–4
–6
–8
16
14
12
10
8
6
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Unemployment
(right scale)
Net cost of capitala
(left scale)
Percent per year Percent
Ireland
4
2
0
–2
–4
–6
–8
12
10
8
6
4
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Unemployment
Net cost of 
capital
Percent per year Percent
Italy
Figure 1.  Unemployment and the Net Cost of Capital in Ireland and Italy, 1960–99
Source: Authors’ calculations using OECD data. 
a. Defined as r* – g, or the world interest rate minus the expected long-term growth rate of labor productivity.
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hiring and thus the growth of employment. Similarly, a decrease in pro-
ductivity or an increase in tax rates on labor, by increasing income and
services from wealth relative to after-tax pay, would exacerbate quitting
and thus lower employee valuations. (Thus the level of productivity and
the tax rate on labor matter for unemployment through their effect on the
after-tax wage relative to the income and services from workers’ wealth.13)
The effect of this income–to–net pay variable on the unemployment rate
may be captured by introducing as a surrogate the total level of income
from private wealth and benefits per worker as a ratio to the productivity
of labor, denoted y~W + y~S, multiplied by the ratio of before-tax to after-tax
wages. We call this compound variable normalized nonwage support.14
The other profitability variable that we have used is the world real price
of energy, but we will not pause to discuss that variable here.  
Figures A3 and A4 in appendix A show trends in income and services
from private wealth and social spending, respectively, juxtaposed against
the unemployment rate in each of the G-7 countries except Japan. The pat-
terns are far from identical from country to country. Yet there is a tendency
among these countries for normalized nonwage support to show a cumula-
tive rise starting in the middle of the 1970s and continuing for many years.
In those countries where productivity accelerated in the 1990s, however,
normalized nonwage support tends to decline sooner or later. Figure 2 again
shows data for Ireland and Italy. The Irish data, which begin in 1977, show
a recent downward trend, thanks to a strong acceleration of productivity,
whereas in Italy no such trend is visible in recent years.
Our previous work estimated equations explaining either the normal-
ized increase in employment or the level of the unemployment rate, with
the lagged unemployment rate always among the explanatory variables.
Equation 1 is a stripped-down version of a typical example of these equa-
tions, reestimated here using a nineteen-country OECD sample for the
period 1960–9815:
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13. The econometric formulation here leaves open the possibility that, in the long run,
wealth will have adjusted so as to restore the ratio of the after-tax wage to wealth to some
long-run level that is independent of tax rates and of the cumulative labor augmentation
from past technical progress.
14. The derivation is laid out in appendix B.
15. The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
(1)
Here u is the rate of unemployment, r* is the world real rate of interest, g
is the (smoothed) rate of change in labor productivity,16 poil is the real price
of oil, y~W + y~S is the ratio of total nonwage support (per worker in the
labor force) to labor productivity, τD is the rate of direct household taxes,
τ P is the rate of payroll taxes, and pi is the rate of price inflation.17
In an effort to control for “effective demand” shocks, we include the
change in the rate of inflation, following Layard, Nickell, and Jackman.18
The idea is that if unemployment changes because of movements in aggre-
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16. This is a Hodrick-Prescott-smoothed rate of change of labor productivity defined as
real GDP per employed worker. The smoothing parameter has a value of 100.
17. We include a dummy variable for Finland and Germany in the 1990s, both of which
experienced shocks due to the disintegration of the Soviet bloc, and for Portugal in the
1970s, when a wave of immigration temporarily raised unemployment in that country.
Even so, our stripped-down baseline regressions do not satisfactorily track the Portuguese
unemployment rate.
18. Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991) and Phelps (1994).
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Figure 2.  Unemployment and Nonwage Support in Ireland and Italy, 1960–99
Source: OECD data. 
a. Defined as yW + yS, or income and services from private wealth (from private financial holdings and consumer durables) plus 
income from social wealth (such as social insurance and social assistance benefits).
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gate demand, this is likely to be reflected in changes in the rate of price
inflation. The inclusion of an inflation shock term may thus remove from
the unemployment series such business-cycle movements, leaving changes
in the natural rate to be explained by the remaining regressors.
We first estimate equation 1 for each country separately, without impos-
ing any cross-country restrictions. This is important to do because, once
we start constraining coefficients to take the same value across countries,
the possibility arises that a significant relationship for some of the coun-
tries will create the illusion of a sample-wide relationship. That is, if the
equation fits for one group of countries but does not fit for another, the
panel estimation may yield significant results due only to the inclusion of
the first group. The results are shown in table A3 in appendix A. The coef-
ficients on the interest rate 1 and oil prices 3 are generally positive,
whereas those on productivity growth 2 and the inflation term  tend to be
negative. However, the coefficient of income from private wealth 4 does
not have the same consistent pattern.
We now impose cross-country restrictions. We constrain 1, 2,, 3, and
4 to have identical values across countries up to a factor of proportional-
ity, i, so that their ratios to one another are the same in all countries: 
(2)
The idea behind this restriction is that the differences in the effect of
shocks across countries lie largely in the degree of rigidity of the real
wage, which can be captured by the parameter i. 
Results from four versions of this equation appear in table 1. The first
version (column 1-1) omits both elements of nonwage support; normalized
income from private wealth (y~W) is then added to the equation in column 1-
2. Next, in column 1-3, we add to the column 1-1 specification the com-
parable variable that measures the level of social spending or transfers
per worker, also normalized by productivity (y~S). Finally, column 1-4
includes both nonwage support variables.19
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19. We have an unbalanced panel when we add income from private wealth because of
missing observations at the beginning of the period.
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The coefficients on real interest rates, productivity growth, and oil prices
are all correctly signed and significant.20 The nonwage support variable is
also significant, although its nonwage income component is less so.21
Table 2 reports, for the baseline equation in column 1-1 of table 1, the
estimates of our fixed effects variable i, the sensitivity coefficients i, and
the persistence parameters i, in addition to the coefficient on the inflation
shock i. We note that many of the “success” economies are high-
sensitivity, low-persistence economies: among these are the United King-
20. We experimented with changing the smoothing parameter used to calculate trend
productivity growth. When it took the values 50, 150, and 250, the coefficient on produc-
tivity growth was, respectively, –0.19 (with a t-statistic of 2.17), –0.23 (2.21), and –0.25
(2.26).
21. Note that the sample changes when we add nonwage income (Australia drops out)
and again when social spending is added (both Australia and New Zealand are omitted).
Table 1.  Regressions for the Constrained Baseline Equationa
Equation
Independent variable 1-1 1-2b 1-3c 1-4c
World real rate of interestd 0.04** 0.02** 0.01** 0.01**
(1.96) (3.08) (2.41) (2.10)
Domestic rate of productivity growthe –0.18** –0.06** –0.03 –0.04**
(2.13) (3.03) (1.39) (2.16)
Real price of oilf 2.39** 0.78** 0.50** 0.80**
(2.58) (3.74) (3.28) (3.45)
Income from private wealthg 0.65
(1.48)
Social spendingh 3.29**
(2.91)
Nonwage supporti 2.44
(2.95)
Source: Authors’ regressions using OECD and Citibase data for 1960–98 (OECD, 1982, 1987; OECD Economic Outlook,
June 1999). 
a. Results are for equation 2. The dependent variable, the unemployment rate, is the OECD standardized rate. Unemployment,
interest rates, and growth rates are expressed as percentages in the equations. The sample consists of nineteen OECD countries
except where noted otherwise. t-statistics are in parentheses. ** denotes significance at the 5 percent level.
b. Australia is omitted from the sample.
c. Australia and New Zealand are omitted from the sample.
d. Real interest rates are calculated from quarterly data on the annual yield on one-year government bonds and the rate of
price inflation in the subsequent four quarters where the price deflator is used. The world real rate of interest r* is calculated as the
average of real rates in the G-7 countries. 
e. Defined as the rate of growth of real GDP per employed worker, smoothed using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smooth-
ing parameter of 100. 
f. Measured as the ratio of the U.S. producer price index (PPI) for crude petroleum to the overall U.S. PPI. 
g. Calculated as the ratio of income from property per worker in the labor force to real GDP per employed worker. 
h. Calculated in the same way as income from private wealth using social security benefits. Payroll taxes are equal to the ratio of
social security contributions to the wage bill, and direct taxes are defined as the ratio of direct household taxes to household income. 
i. The sum of income from private wealth and social spending. 
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Table 2.  Further Estimation Results for the Constrained Baseline Equationa
Lagged Sensitivity Coefficient on
Constant unemployment coefficient price inflation
Country (i) rate (i) (i) (i) R2 Adjusted R2
Australia 0.71 0.84 1.00 –5.77 0.93 0.91
(2.13) (14.04) (0.66)
Austria 0.20 0.96 0.32 –6.29 0.98 0.98
(1.76) (36.93) (2.15) (1.94)
Belgium 1.26 0.83 1.53 –3.46 0.98 0.97
(2.80) (18.45) (2.26) (0.60)
Canada 1.77 0.70 1.32 –19.18 0.89 0.87
(3.37) (9.46) (2.08) (1.82)
Denmark 0.75 0.84 1.10 –8.78 0.94 0.93
(2.37) (15.68) (1.84) (0.92)
Finland 1.51 0.58 0.90 –8.16 0.95 0.93
(4.07) (7.95) (1.68) (1.03)
France 0.70 0.92 0.69 –1.42 0.99 0.98
(3.08) (34.39) (2.11) (0.30)
Germany 0.69 0.81 0.82 –19.69 0.98 0.97
(3.11) (18.12) (2.15) (2.34)
Ireland 1.51 0.86 1.91 –1.55 0.96 0.95
(2.56) (21.08) (2.28) (0.25)
Italy 0.56 0.95 0.33 –8.08 0.98 0.97
(2.35) (30.77) (1.62) (2.29)
Japan 0.20 0.93 0.09 –2.24 0.96 0.95
(1.56) (15.96) (1.42) (2.21)
Netherlands 0.94 0.73 1.35 –2.26 0.94 0.92
(2.60) (10.80) (2.13) (0.45)
New Zealand 0.47 0.92 0.60 –1.05 0.95 0.93
(1.95) (20.53) (1.69) (0.44)
Norway 0.44 0.88 0.32 –7.10 0.90 0.88
(2.05) (15.61) (1.42) (1.71)
Portugal 2.00 0.61 –0.18 –4.46 0.85 0.81
(3.16) (5.95) (0.59) (1.08)
Spain 2.09 0.85 1.84 –10.67 0.98 0.98
(3.22) (23.53) (2.21) (1.28)
Sweden 0.31 0.93 0.25 –3.85 0.89 0.87
(1.43) (15.82) (1.01) (0.70)
United Kingdom 1.23 0.70 2.41 –3.63 0.96 0.95
(2.85) (12.89) (2.39) (0.76)
United States 2.58 0.48 1.16 –18.71 0.76 0.72
(4.08) (4.26) (2.03) (1.73)
Source: See table 1.
a. Results are for equation 1-1 in table 1; t-statistics are in parentheses.
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dom ( = 2.41,  = 0.70), the Netherlands ( = 1.35,  = 0.73), and the
United States ( = 1.16,  = 0.48).
Table 3 quantifies the impact of real interest rates and the productivity
growth rate on unemployment. It shows both the instantaneous (“current”)
effect and the steady-state effect of a rise in r* of 5 percentage points, or
500 basis points, and a fall in the rate of trend productivity growth by 
3 percentage points, for a subsample of the countries. Our world real inter-
est rate variable rose by 5 percentage points between the 1970s and 1980s,
and a slowdown in the rate of productivity growth of between 2 and 
3 percentage points was not uncommon between the average of the 1960s
and the average of the 1970s.
Both the instantaneous and the steady-state effects differ across coun-
tries. The magnitude of the interest rate effects is in the same ballpark as
recent estimates by Blanchard and Justin Wolfers,22 but the effect of
growth appears to be substantially higher. Taken together, a simultaneous
rise in r* and fall in g can account for much of the rise in average unem-
ployment between the 1960s and the 1980s. Figure 3 plots the actual
decade-to-decade change in average unemployment for  recent decades
against the fitted change from equation 2 for the nineteen countries in our
sample. The fit is quite good for both the 1980s and the 1990s, although
it is slightly less so for the latter, suggesting that the equation does not
fully explain the cross-country variation in the pace of recovery.
Explaining Differences Across Countries: 
Shocks Versus Institutions
In our baseline regression, we estimated the value of the sensi-
tivity coefficient (i) as well as the country-specific fixed effects (i) and the
persistence parameter (i) in equation 2. We now look to the institutional
structures of these countries to explain the differences in these three para-
meters across countries. But note that the parameters i and i affect only
the degree of the unemployment response to macroeconomic shocks.
Layard and coauthors hypothesized that unemployment differences
across countries could be attributed to differences in the replacement ratio
of unemployment benefits, their duration, union coverage and density,
22. Blanchard and Wolfers (2000).
union and employer coordination in wage setting, active labor market
programs, and an index of employment protection.23 We find that these
variables explain around 50 percent of the variation in the  and  coeffi-
cients (table 4). The fixed effects () are a positive function of the replace-
ment ratio and of union coverage and density, and a negative function of
union coordination. The sensitivity to shocks () is a positive function of
the duration of benefits and union density and a negative function of union
coordination and labor market expenditure. The table reports the results for
both the instantaneous effect and, by taking into account the persistence
parameter i, the steady-state effect.24
We conclude that the sign of each coefficient in the  and  equations is
as expected from a reading of Jorgen Elmeskov and coauthors, Layard and
coauthors, and Nickell.25 These results confirm the significant effect of
labor market institutions on medium-term unemployment changes. But it
may not be the institutions themselves that are causing the unemploy-
ment problem, but rather an unfortunate combination of labor demand
shocks and institutions. 
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23. Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991). See also Nickell and Layard (1999), from
which our data come.
24. The sensitivity and persistence parameters are strongly negatively correlated. 
25. Elmeskov, Martin, and Scarpetta (1998), Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991), and
Nickell and Layard (1999).
Table 3.  Estimated Effects of Interest Rate Changes and Changes in Productivity
Growth on Unemployment
Percentage points
Change in unemployment (u)
United United
France Germany Italy Kingdom States
Change in real interest rate 
(r*) of 5 percentage points
Current effect 0.15 0.17 0.07 0.51 0.25
Steady-state effect 1.84 0.92 1.40 1.55 0.48
Change in productivity 
growth rate (g) of 
–3 percentage points
Current effect 0.38 0.45 0.18 1.33 0.64
Steady-state effect 4.78 2.38 3.66 4.03 1.25
Source: Authors’ calculations based on regression results in tables 1 and 2.
Can the Baseline Equation Account for the Diversity 
of Recent Experience?
The question arises whether our simple baseline equation 2 explains,
without the benefit of new ideas, the diverse experience of the OECD
countries in the 1990s. To assess this, we estimated equation 2 for the
period 1960–91 and then performed out-of-sample simulations and com-
pared these with the actual pattern of unemployment during the period
1992–98. Table 5 classifies the nineteen countries in our sample according
to whether the difference between the actual and the predicted unemploy-
ment rate was less than 1.5 percentage points in 1998.
In the U.S. case, unemployment in 1998 was 1.78 percentage points
lower than expected, so the recent decline is not fully accounted for. In
recent years Ireland has likewise done better than what one would have
expected from our model, Denmark and the United Kingdom have done
about as well as one would have expected, and Australia has fared some-
what worse. On the continent, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain all have
done worse than expected.
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Figure 3.  Actual and Predicted Changes in Average Unemployment Across Decades 
in Nineteen OECD Countries
Source: Authors’ calculations using OECD data. 
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A key question addressed in this paper is what accounts for the cross-
country differences in unemployment rates over the 1990s. We consider
three types of explanations. First, there is the appeal to labor market
reforms by the OECD Secretariat. This view would credit the strong reduc-
tion of unemployment in some countries to policy reforms rather than
private sector market forces. There is also the New Keynesian view that
cyclical downturns have a persistent effect on unemployment through 
some form of hysteresis, and the anti-inflationist view that some coun-
tries lowered their equilibrium unemployment path by conquering infla-
tion. Finally, deriving from our own models’ property that employment
depends on the level of asset valuations, there is the empirical hypothesis
that a stock market index or market capitalization series provides a proxy
for those asset valuations that play a pivotal role in employment growth.
The last section of this paper compares the predictions of this hypothesis
with the actual data.
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Table 4.  Regressions Explaining Differences in Baseline Equation Parametersa
Fixed effects Sensitivity to shocks
Steady-state Steady-state
Current effect effect Current effect effect
Independent variable (ˆi) [ˆ/(1 – ˆ)] (ˆi) [ˆi /(1 – ˆ)]
Constant 0.13 3.27 0.81 4.86
(0.33) (1.19) (2.66) (2.10)
Replacement ratio 0.01
(2.28)
Duration of benefits 0.20 1.10
(3.04) (2.65)
Union density 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.11
(3.45) (1.45) (5.28) (2.20)
Union coordination –0.86 –3.74 –0.68 –2.62
(3.45) (3.76) (4.86) (2.34)
Union coverage 0.35 2.94
(2.26) (2.66)
Labor market expenditure –0.02 –0.13
(3.42) (1.86)
R2 0.54 0.52 0.69 0.57
Adjusted R2 0.41 0.43 0.61 0.45
Source: Regression results using the equation described below.
a. The table shows regressions of the form 
x = 	0 + 	1Y + ε,
where x =  or , and Y is a vector of the following explanatory variables: the replacement ratio, the duration of unemployment
benefits (the number of months at which benefits continue at a reasonable level), union coverage, union density, coordination
between unions and employers (measured as an index where 3 denotes maximum coordination), employment protection, and
expenditure on active labor market policies. Data are averages for the variables for the nineteen countries in table 2 for the
period 1983–88. t-statistics are in parentheses.
Reforms
Labor Market Reforms
A careful study by the OECD Secretariat has identified several coun-
tries that it regards as having accepted its proposals for labor market
reform.26 The recommendations involve measures to reduce or eliminate
labor and product market restrictions and regulations, to increase spending
on active labor market programs, and to reduce the duration of unemploy-
ment benefits. The countries are Australia, Denmark, Ireland, the Nether-
lands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Three recent papers
describe some of these changes:27
—Apart from Australia, all of these countries either kept unchanged or
reduced the generosity of the unemployment benefit system in the 1990s.
But Finland, France, Germany, Spain, and Sweden, all countries usually
not counted among the success stories, did the same (although later in the
case of Spain).
—Denmark, Ireland, and the Netherlands also spent more than the
OECD average on active labor market programs, and they increased this
spending in the 1990s. 
26. Elmeskov, Martin, and Scarpetta (1998).
27. Scarpetta (1996), Elmeskov, Martin, and Scarpetta (1998), and Nickell and van
Ours (2000).
Table 5.  Out-of-Sample Simulations: Actual Minus Predicted Unemployment in 1998
Percentage points
Unemployment lower Unemployment higher
than expected Unemployment as expected than expected
Country Difference Country Difference Country Difference
Finland –2.67 Austria 0.57 Australia 1.89
Ireland –4.49 Denmark –0.25 Belgium 4.70
New Zealand –1.72a Canada 0.80 France 3.26
Norway –3.32 Japan 1.35 Germany 3.59
United States –1.78 Netherlands –1.15 Italy 3.55
United Kingdom 0.39 Portugal 2.63b
Spain 4.30
Sweden 4.38
Source: Authors’ calculations based on results in tables 1 and 2.
a. Estimated using data up to 1994.
b. Estimated using data up to 1996.
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—All six countries reduced the labor tax wedge in the 1990s. 
—Union power was reduced in the United Kingdom in the 1980s, and
in New Zealand in the 1990s. Australia and Denmark moved toward
decentralization of wage bargaining. Governments in Ireland and the
Netherlands introduced greater coordination with unions and employers. 
—Employment protection legislation has been relaxed in Australia,
the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
One can point to several other significant institutional reforms in the
1990s. They include the gradual reduction of the minimum wage in the
United States, the increase in the amount and coverage of the U.S. earned
income tax credit, and the increasing exemption of low-income households
from income tax and the massive subsidies for wage supplements or for
training in the Netherlands, France, and the United States. 
Table 6 demonstrates the power of labor market institutions in explain-
ing cross-country differences in average unemployment. Our equation
regressing the average rate of unemployment in the 1980s against a set of
institutional variables used by Nickell and Layard for the years 1983–88 is
able to explain around 65 percent of the variation in unemployment.28 The
signs of the institutional variables are as expected, and all the variables are
significant. Unemployment disparities thus appear due to a high replacement
ratio of unemployment benefits, long duration of these benefits, high cover-
age and density of unions, employment protection, and low coordination of
unions and employers, in addition to low labor market expenditure.29
Although the importance of labor market institutions is almost uni-
versally accepted, it is also widely believed—certainly by us—that the
shocks that pushed the equilibrium unemployment path to higher and
higher tracks in the 1970s and 1980s were mostly of a different nature.30
We have already indicated the institutions we have emphasized in past
work. Many of the labor market institutions in the OECD countries may
have played a role in propagating shocks rather than originating them,
since they had their origins well before the rise, beginning in the mid-
1970s, in unemployment rates.31 In view of the past influence of market
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28. Their ideas were introduced in Nickell and Layard (1999).
29. When Sweden is removed from the sample, however, the labor market expenditure
variable becomes insignificant.
30. See Fitoussi and Phelps (1988); Phelps (1994); Phelps and Zoega (1997, 1998);
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000).
31. See Krugman (1994) on this point.
forces—productivity growth and the rest—we think that exclusive
reliance on institutional change as an explanation of recent developments
is premature.
Our approach differs from that of Elmeskov, Martin, and Scarpetta in
that they examine a panel of countries in which the institutional variables
explain mainly the cross-sectional variation in unemployment as in table 6.
They do not test whether changes in labor market institutions as opposed
to macroeconomic variables can account for observed changes in average
unemployment. To repeat, it is possible that these institutions have mainly
been important in determining the impact of global shocks rather than as
the forcing variables. 
We now attempt to explain variation in the change in unemployment
between the periods 1980–89 and 1990–98 across the nineteen OECD
countries by changes in the institutional variables alone. Table 7 presents
the results, which show that an increase in union coordination tends to
decrease unemployment. However, this result stems only from a fall in
union coordination in Finland, which experienced a rise in unemployment.
Table 6.  Regressions Explaining the Unemployment Rate in the 1980s with Labor
Market Institutionsa
Independent variable Estimated coefficient
Constant 5.02
(2.00)
Replacement ratio 0.12
(2.95)
Duration of benefits 0.79
(2.13)
Union density + union coverage 0.08
(1.68)
Union coordination –3.06
(2.35)
Employer coordination –3.95
(3.46)
Labor market expenditure –0.09
(2.14)
R2 0.79
Adjusted R2 0.65
Source: Authors’ calculations using data supplied by Richard Layard, London School of Economics, and Stephen Nickell,
University of Oxford.
a. The table shows regressions of the form
u80s = 	0 + 	1Y + ε,
where u80s is the average unemployment rate in the 1980s and Y is the set of explanatory variables. The institutional measures are
averages for the nineteen countries in table 2 for the period 1983–88. t-statistics are in parentheses.
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All the other variables describing labor market reforms are insignificant,
and some are incorrectly signed.
Next we test for the effect of macroeconomic shocks; table 8 reports the
results. We include the change in the normalized nonwage support and
the change in the rate of productivity growth while omitting the least sig-
nificant among the institutional variables. An increase in the share of
income from private wealth to GDP is associated with an increase in the
unemployment rate, and an increase in the rate of productivity growth is
associated with a fall in unemployment. 
On the basis of this and other evidence, we believe that variation in
macroeconomic shocks alone cannot adequately explain the variation in
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Table 7.  Regressions Explaining Changes in Unemployment, 1980s to 1990s, with
Labor Market Reformsa
Independent variable Estimated coefficient
Constant 2.42
(2.13)
Average unemployment rate in the 1980s –0.20
(1.17)
Replacement ratio –0.20
(1.02)
Duration of benefits 0.61
(0.72)
Union density 0.13
(1.00)
Union coordination –5.53
(4.17)
Employer coordination 5.25
(1.40)
Labor market expenditure –0.01
(0.07)
Union coverage 0.76
(0.50)
Employment protection –0.72
(0.42)
R2 0.73
Adjusted R2 0.45
Source: Authors’ calculations using data supplied by Richard Layard, London School of Economics, and Stephen Nickell,
University of Oxford.
a. The table shows regressions of the form
u90s – u80s = 	0 + 	1u80s + 	2Y + ε,
where u90s is the average unemployment rate in the 1990s, u80s is the average rate in the 1980s, and Y is the set of explanatory
variables. Data are average values for the nineteen countries in table 2 for the periods 1983–88 and 1989–94. t-statistics are in
parentheses.
the evolution of unemployment without taking into account differences 
in the way these economies respond to such shocks, including institutional
differences. Our estimation results for equation 2 in tables 1 and 2 dem-
onstrate the potency of the interplay of institutions and shocks and
demonstrate that these interactive effects can explain the differences in
unemployment trends across the countries.
We conclude that the institutional reforms in the OECD proposal can
only be a small part of the story. In several countries, such as Ireland, equi-
librium unemployment has fallen in the absence of net reform, in our
estimation, whereas in others the net reform has apparently not affected
equilibrium unemployment significantly. 
Monetary Theses
Here we examine first the hypothesis that tight monetary policy in
France, Italy, and some other aspirants to EMU membership operated to
keep employment far below its structuralist equilibrium path. This could
explain why unemployment was higher in 1998 than what our baseline
Table 8.  Regressions Explaining Changes in Unemployment, 1980s to 1990s, with
Macroeconomic Shocksa
Independent variable Estimated coefficient
Constant 1.01
(1.04)
Average unemployment rate in the 1980s –0.04
(0.43)
Union density 0.32**
4.14
Union coordination –5.57**
5.20
Nonwage support 17.50
1.72
Trend productivity growth –1.20**
1.80
R2 0.74
Adjusted R2 0.62
Source: Regression results from the equation described below.
a. The table shows regressions of the form
u90s – u80s = 	0 + 	1u80s + 	2Y + ε,
where u90s is the average unemployment rate in the 1990s, u80s is the average rate in the 1980s, and Y is the set of explanatory
variables: nonwage support, trend productivity growth, and the fitted unemployment rate from benchmark equation 2. t-statistics
are in parentheses. ** denotes significance at the 5 percent level.
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equation predicted in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. The idea is that
countries that try to defend the value of their currencies by raising their
interest rates suffer an additional rise in unemployment. 
We again used the cross section of nineteen OECD countries to attempt
to explain the variation in unemployment growth between the 1980s and
1990s with variation in changes in different measures of monetary policy.
In particular, we focused on the following hypotheses:
—That changes in the average rate of inflation may cause changes in
average unemployment, as argued by George Akerlof, William Dickens, and
George Perry.32 Here expected inflation enters the cognitive model used by
decisionmakers only if inflation is above some threshold. The result is a per-
manent trade-off between inflation and unemployment at low rates of unem-
ployment. We included in our equations both the difference in the average
inflation rate between decades and its square, to account for nonlinearities.
—That positive inflation shocks reduce average unemployment through
some form of hysteresis. We included both the difference in the average
inflation shock between the two decades and the difference between the
maximum positive and negative inflation shocks in each of the decades.
—That changes in average short-term nominal or real interest rates
cause changes in average unemployment. Here we take a rise in either to
represent contractionary monetary policy.
—Finally, that changes in the average slope of the yield curve from
decade to decade may signify a regime shift in the monetary policy stance.
We first report, in table 9, the results for the inflation variables. Col-
umn 9-1 shows that the average level of inflation is correlated with the
average level of unemployment, but the two measures of inflation
shocks—which measure changes in the rate of inflation within each
period—perform poorly (columns 9-2 and 9-3). An increase in average
unemployment tends to accompany a decrease in the average level of infla-
tion. This is in accordance with the thesis of Akerlof and coauthors but
explains only around 15 percent of the variation in the data, indicating that
this cannot be the most important causal variable. We also included a
dummy variable for those countries that stayed in the European monetary
system during the 1990s, but this did not affect the results reported in the
table, and the dummy was insignificant in every case.
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32. Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996). 
We then looked at the change in average (short-term) real and nominal
interest rates between the two decades and the change in the average slope
of the yield curve. Of these, the real rate of interest performs best 
(table 10). Changes in the domestic (short-term) real rate of interest go hand
in hand with changes in average unemployment. An increase in the short-
term rate, representing contractionary monetary policy, raises the aver-
age rate of unemployment, but the variable can explain only around 
25 percent of the variation in the data. An upward-sloping yield curve,
representing expansionary monetary policy, is also associated with high
unemployment. Finally, in a regression that included both the level of infla-
tion and the short-term real rate of interest, the latter gave better results. 
Table 9.  Regressions Explaining Changes in Unemployment, 1980s to 1990s, with
Inflation Variablesa
Equation
Independent variable 9-1 9-2 9-3 9-4
Constant 1.02 3.16** –1.96 2.84
(0.64) (2.27) (1.33) (1.81)
Average unemployment rate in the 1980s –0.27 –0.19 –0.20 –0.12
(1.85) (1.07) (1.23) (0.64)
Level of inflation –1.32**
(2.02)
Level of inflation squared –13.08**
(1.97)
Average inflation shock 0.08
(0.67)
Average inflation shock squared –2.76
(1.19)
Maximum positive inflation shock –0.08
(0.63)
Maximum positive inflation shock squared –1.05
(0.40)
Maximum negative inflation shock –0.03
(1.67)
Maximum negative inflation shock squared –0.14
(0.31)
R2 0.29 0.15 0.13 0.18
Adjusted R2 0.15 –0.02 –0.05 0.01
Source: Regression results from the equation described below.
a. The table shows regressions of the form
u90s – u80s = 	0 + 	1u80s + 	2Y + ε,
where u90s is the average unemployment rate in the 1990s, u80s is the average rate in the 1980s, and Y is the set of explanatory
variables: average inflation, the average of the first difference of inflation, and the difference between the largest annual changes
in the inflation rate in each decade. t-statistics are in parentheses. ** denotes significance at the 5 percent level.
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These results constitute some evidence that differences in monetary pol-
icy across countries made a difference for their unemployment experi-
ence over the course of the decade. It remains a tenable hypothesis that
monetary policy in Continental Europe caused unemployment to exceed 
its natural path over most of the 1990s, for reasons having to do with the
runup to EMU, the Maastricht Treaty, and the tight-money policies insti-
tuted by the Deutsche Bundesbank to offset expenditure for German uni-
fication. But the evidence is not conclusive. Moreover, the tight-money
episode, however important its influence may have been, appears to be
over. Germany and most of the economies tied closely to it, such as Bel-
gium, France, Italy, and Spain, no longer have comparatively high short-
term real rates of interest; rates in Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands,
Portugal, and the United Kingdom are appreciably higher, some markedly
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Table 10.  Regressions Explaining Changes in Unemployment, 1980s to 1990s, with
Interest Rate Variables
Equation
Independent variable 13-1 13-2 13-3
Constant 4.11 1.55 1.60
(2.83) (1.16) (0.65)
Average unemployment rate in the 1980s –0.24 –0.13 –0.21
(1.74) (0.91) (1.20)
Real interest rate 0.84
(3.16)
Real interest rate squared –0.53
(4.22)
Nominal interest rate –0.69
(0.48)
Nominal interest rate squared –0.08
(0.42)
Yield curve 0.76
(2.15)
Yield curve squared 0.20
(1.13)
R2 0.38 0.09 0.35
Adjusted R2 0.25 –0.10 0.21
Source: Regression results from the equations described below.
a. The table shows regressions of the form
u90s – u80s = 	0 + 	1u80s + 	2Y + ε,
where u90s is the average unemployment rate in the 1990s, u80s is the average rate in the 1980s, and Y is the set of explanatory
variables: the average of the short-term real rate of interest (one-year government bonds), the average of the short-term nominal
interest rate, and the average slope of the yield curve (long minus short). t-statistics are in parentheses.
so.33 Correspondingly, in the first group of countries the unemployment
rate has tended to recede, mostly in 1998–99, to levels of the early 1990s.
In France, for example, unemployment has fallen to 10.6 percent, a level
last seen in 1992. And inflation rates have stopped falling. So it is doubtful
that monetary policy over the whole decade is still playing a part in the
failure of employment in these countries to recover more strongly.
To sum up the results thus far: in our analysis, cross-country variation
among OECD countries in the pace of labor market reform and in changes
in inflation and nominal interest rates do not adequately account for the
observed variation in the fall in unemployment. To explain the variation
in the unemployment data found in the 1990s—to understand why unem-
ployment has, for example, fallen so much in Ireland and the United States
while remaining so high in France and Italy—therefore requires adding
at least one other causal force to the account. We turn now to our own
proposed hypothesis.
The Role of Asset Prices in the Employment Impact 
of the “New Economy”
We begin by arguing that the prospect of a “new economy”—a prospect
closer at hand in some OECD countries than in others—offers in theory a
possible explanation of the uneven structural recoveries of the 1990s. We
then assess the predictions of this argument against a variety of evidence.
The thesis goes roughly as follows. In virtually every OECD country,
recent advances in information and communications technologies have cre-
ated expectations of a large stepup in productivity, and thus in the profit
per unit on various business assets. The prospect of a world in which most
firms and persons can access the Internet from computers, mobile phones,
and television has stimulated expectations of new opportunities for prof-
itable investment, including investment in new employees, although these
opportunities are seen as more imminent in some countries than in others.
Where this prospect appears to be relatively near, as in the United States,
there has been a galvanizing effect among telecommunications firms and
among equipment manufacturers, service providers, and content produc-
33. See the convenient table in Financial Times, June 12, 1999.
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ers for the Internet. The consequent rise in financial wealth in this sector has
had the secondary effect of driving up home construction and other invest-
ment in consumer durables. As a result, the economy appears to have all the
trappings of a general investment boom. We would note that the expectation
of any other development boosting expected profitability at some time in
the future—globalization or advances in biogenetics, for example—would
serve as well. (Of course, to the extent the expectation comes to be seen as
exaggerated and is therefore revised downward, the boom will be scaled
back. But it is the expectation that matters, as long as it lasts.)
This confidence-driven investment boom, our thesis continues, has the
effect of creating jobs and pulling up real wages. And the mechanism that
ties the expected future leap of profitability to a boom in the labor market
involves changes in the valuation of business assets. The transmission of
the boom from business asset markets to the labor market is tailor-made
for our forward-looking structuralist model—not that our models are likely
to be the only ones to portray expectations of a new earnings plateau in the
future as sparking an inflation-free boom in the present. Although
employee incentives are the heart of these incentive wage models’ gener-
ation of unemployment (without them there would be no unemployment),
our models also have a brain. Value-maximizing firms form expectations
about the gross profit stream obtainable over the future from new invest-
ments, which drives real valuations of business assets, which in turn have
an impact on rates of investment in these assets and ultimately on the equi-
librium (that is, correct-expectations) path of employment. In these mod-
els, an anticipated one-time step increase in productivity precipitates an
immediate jump of asset values in anticipation of greater returns (rents) on
those assets once productivity has increased, and such revaluations lead
immediately to rising employment in the near term as well as a rise in
real wages. Obviously the value that managers rationally place on an
employee having the requisite familiarization with and orientation to the
firm’s operations and objectives (firm-specific training) is one of these
revaluations, and an important one. However, the argument does not
absolutely require the assumption of firm-specific training, since the other
asset revaluations may very well affect positively the demand for labor.
A stylized description of the effects of the future productivity shock
under discussion is provided by the turnover-training model, which
focuses exclusively on the intellectual capital that firms invest in their
work forces and supposes for simplicity that all firms in the model’s open
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economy are in the same industry. Figure 4 describes how the expectation
of a single future step increase in the marginal and average value produc-
tivity of employees causes an anticipatory jump in the valuation of the
trained employee. Importantly, employment is related here to the asset
price normalized by productivity.34 The reason is that hiring depends on
the ratio of the asset price, qN, to productivity, 
; so, indirectly, does quit-
ting.35 In figure 4, the asset price curve depicts how, if it were stationary,
the ratio of the asset price to productivity (qN/
) would depend on the
tightness of the labor market (1 – u), and the employment curve depicts
how, if it were stationary, the level of 1 – u would depend on qN/
. The
medium-term rest point is at the curves’ intersection.36
With this diagram we can describe precisely the equilibrium scenario
that follows the newfound expectation of a future increase in productiv-
ity. Starting from the rest point, qN/
 must jump upward in anticipation
of the increased qN following the future increase in productivity. There-
upon, both qN/
 and 1 – u must be rising, as hiring is up and quitting is
down, owing to the rise of qN relative to 
, although the ensuing labor
market tightening will operate to attenuate those two effects. When the
great day arrives, qN/
 must jump downward, since 
 jumps upward
and qN does not jump at all. Thereafter qN continues to rise, gradually
regaining its former proportionality with 
. In this aftermath, employment
recedes back to its steady-state level, since qN in this phase is depressed
relative to productivity.37 It is important to add that the positive impact of
34. The valuation of a prepared employee is normalized by the productivity of workers
on the production line gross of the interest and depreciation on the equipment used, since
employees moving from production to training are assumed to need an unchanged assort-
ment of equipment.
35. Given nonwage income relative to productivity, quitting is a function of the wage rel-
ative to productivity, which wage setting makes a function of asset valuation relative to
productivity.
36. Appendix C provides information on the structure of the model, the slopes of the two
curves, and the dynamics of the system. Or see Hoon and Phelps (1992, 1996) and Phelps
(1994).
37. Another sort of shock is the sudden increase in the expected and actual growth rate
of productivity. We do not rely on this kind of shock to motivate the introduction of asset
prices, since if it were the only kind occurring, we would expect that our measured produc-
tivity growth variable would suffice to pick up the workings of this expectation. For the
record, such a shock shifts the asset price curve upward. Thus it lifts the downward-sloping
equilibrium approach path governing employment and the normalized asset value. In the
equilibrium scenario, starting from the rest point, qN/
 overshoots, subsequently giving up
some of its gain along the path to the rest point.
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expected future profitability on the valuation of (nontradable) capital
goods, such as office and factory space, is also expansionary.38
An ideal test of these structuralist models would estimate what impact
the valuations placed by managers on trained employees, tangible capital
goods, and customers have on the pace of employment increase. Lacking
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38. Suppose that this good is produced with labor alone, but that the sector producing
consumer goods uses the nontradable capital good as well as labor. Then the increase in
the price of the capital good is a rise in the value productivity of labor producing it. As a
result, wage rates are initially pulled upward relative to wealth, quit rates drop, and both
the asset price curve and the employment curve are shifted in an expansionary way.
Employment 
curve
Asset
price
curve
1 – u 1
qN

Asset prices normalized to productivity (qN/)
Employment as a ratio to the labor force (1 – u)
Figure 4.  Response of Employee Valuation to an Expected Increase in Employee 
Productivity
data on most of these shadow prices, we improvise by hypothesizing that
one or another measure of the firms’ value in the capital market can serve
as a proxy for these shadow prices. The next few sections pursue succes-
sive implementations of this idea.
Returning to our two baseline equations 1 and 2, we now proceed to
explore the explanatory power of capital market measures of market capi-
talization either as a reflection or as a sort of cause of managers’ valuations
of their business assets (employees, customers, and fixed assets). In our
interpretation, managers learn things that inspire them to raise their valu-
ations, and then lay plans to invest in new (as well as old) employees. But
meanwhile market analysts catch wind of the brightened prospects and
drive up share prices in advance of all or most of the increase in business
assets acquired. Our econometric tests are shaped accordingly. But it could
be that assets do not lag behind valuations, and it is even possible that
share prices lag the accumulation of business assets, both driven by
brighter prospects of profitability down the road.
To begin, we try adding to the above set of explanatory variables the
real share price, pS, as a proxy for both the effective cost of capital and
the profitability of one employee with his or her equilibrium outfit of tan-
gible capital and customers. More precisely, pS stands as a proxy for qN, the
valuation of the trained employee. On that interpretation, the share price
must be entered as a ratio to the productivity of labor, which, abstracting
from capital other than trained employees for the moment, is given sim-
ply by the (advancing) technology parameter 
t.  The reason is that the hir-
ing decision must weigh the value of a new trained employee against the
opportunity cost of the “trainers” orienting the new recruit. That cost is the
existing employees’ productivity in production. Recall, however, that
although the hire rate may be simply determined in this way, the increase
in employment is equal to hiring net of quitting and dismissals for shirk-
ing. In addition, the rates of quitting and of shirking are functions of the
income from private and social assets that workers can fall back on when
they quit or are dismissed. The new equation is:
(3) ˜ ˜ ˜
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Note that the cost of capital, r*– gi, reappears in the equation in spite
of the introduction of the stock market variable. That is because the former
has an impact on the amount of interest to be deducted from productivity
in the calculation of the “demand wage” from the condition of zero pure
profit (even if the valuation of the asset were unchanged). And a decrease
in the demand wage, by stimulating more quitting, lowers employment
growth at the current unemployment rate.39 We stress that if the cost of
capital receives credit for its total effect on employment in the statistical
estimation, the share price will play the role of conveying expectations of
future shocks to productivity and thus profitability. 
Table 11 presents the results. When the normalized share price is
included, in column 11-2, we find it to have a negative coefficient—a
higher value corresponds to lower unemployment—and it is significant at
the 5 percent level.
Column 11-3 instead adds the ratio of the national share price index to
the OECD average share price in the sample, to test whether domestic
share prices survive as a significant explanatory variable when the world
average is introduced. We find that they do. It is of interest to note that,
since the coefficients on the two stock market indicators are not signifi-
cantly different from each other, an increase in the world share price index
that is unaccompanied by a change in the national share price index has
no significant effect on that nation’s own unemployment rate.
A basic question posed by this paper is whether differences in the evo-
lution of share prices across countries can explain why some economies’
employment rates have improved more than expected, while others have
done worse.40 We now look at the country data to see whether we can
explain the pattern shown in table 5—that is, to see why some countries
have had lower and others higher unemployment in the recent past than
predicted by our baseline equation. We rank the countries according to
the rise in average share prices and the change in average unemployment
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39. There are also some by-products of the coexistence of r* – gi. with the share price.
There is a benefit from having the cost of capital there, if our data on average share price are
not accurate depictors of the value of the business sector as a whole, or if share price fluc-
tuations are neither the effect nor the cause of changes in managers’ valuations of business
assets. Then it is at least possible that r* and g will survive to demonstrate that asset valua-
tions are important.
40. A related question is whether, at the microeconomic level, company employment
moves with share prices in the long run—that is, do persistently low share prices imply
persistently low employment? Appendix D finds that this is in fact so in our sample.
between the 1970s (1970–79) and the 1990s (1990–99) and show the rela-
tionship between the two in figure 5. The rank correlation is –0.60, which
implies that the greater the rise in share prices, the smaller the rise (or the
larger the fall) in average unemployment.  
This relationship also emerges when we add the change in the normal-
ized share price between the average of the 1980s and the average of the
1990s to the cross-section estimation above. Table 12 is an extension of
table 8 in that changes in share prices are added to the list of macro-
economic shocks. 
We now look more closely at U.S. data; then at data from the high-
unemployment countries of France, Germany, Italy, and Spain; and finally
at data from two countries that have had lower unemployment than
expected: Ireland and New Zealand. 
United States
In the United States, estimates of the natural rate of unemployment
drifted upward in the 1970s and 1980s,41 but data for the 1990s show a
41. See Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (1991) and Phelps and Zoega (1997).
Table 11.  Baseline Equation Explaining Unemployment with Measures of Share
Prices Added, 1960–98a
Equation
Independent variable 11-1 11-2 11-3
World real rate of interest 0.01** 0.02** 0.01**
(2.10) (2.18) (2.11)
Trend productivity growth –0.04** –0.02 –0.02
(2.16) (0.93) (1.25)
Real price of oil 0.80** 0.48** 0.41**
(3.45) (2.58) (2.42)
Nonwage support 2.44** 2.39** 2.31**
(2.95) (2.52) (2.59)
Share price normalized by productivity –0.26**
(2.48)
Relative share price –0.18**
(2.55)
World average share price –0.29**
(2.28)
Source: Regression results based on equation 3. Share price data from International Monetary Fund, International Financial
Statistics, various issues.
a. Variables are in percentages except for the price of shares and the price of oil. The share price index is normalized by labor
productivity, which is defined as GDP per employed worker. The world average share price is the simple average of the normalized
national indexes for eighteen OECD countries (Australia, New Zealand, and Portugal are excluded because of limited data cov-
erage). t-statistics are in parentheses. ** denotes significance at the 5 percent level.
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downward movement, with a sharp drop beginning at mid-decade. The U.S.
unemployment rate in 1998 was around 1.56 percentage points below what
our baseline regression predicted in out-of-sample simulations. The forces
behind these recent developments are a subject of debate. One of us
recently argued that the steep descent of the natural rate in the United States
since early 1995 is closely associated with the stock market boom:42 The
rise in the price of equity may reflect a rise in the valuation of the mar-
ginal employee. That in turn would cause the rate of inflow into employ-
ment to increase, as firms expand their hiring and training. To assess this
hypothesis, we show in figure 6 a stock market index for the United States,
normalized by productivity, alongside the rate of employment.
It appears that the share price series tracks the low-frequency, decade-
to-decade movements in the employment rate fairly well. Note that this
occurs at lower than so-called business-cycle frequencies. In fact, the dis-
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42. Phelps (1999).
Figure 5.  Ranking of Eighteen OECD Countries by Changes in Share Prices and in
Unemployment Between 1970–79 and 1990–99
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Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues; OECD Employment Outlook, various issues.
a. The country with the largest rise in normalized share prices (or in unemployment) is ranked 1, and the country with the 
smallest rise (or largest fall) is ranked 18. (Portugal is excluded because of lack of data.) Share prices are normalized to 
productivity.
crepancy between the two series points to business cycles that have 
brought either accelerating or decelerating inflation. This indicates a diver-
gence between the actual unemployment rate and the natural rate. Data 
for the late 1960s, a period of rising inflation, show a rise in employment
not explained by high asset prices. The early 1980s witnessed a cyclical
downturn caused by the disinflation engineered by the Federal Reserve
under Paul Volcker. Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, in the last
few years unemployment may have been above its natural rate, not because
of a rise in actual employment but because of a fall in the natural rate itself.
This may have allowed the unparalleled recent expansion to continue with-
out rising inflation.
France, Germany, Italy, and Spain
These four countries all had higher unemployment in the 1990s than
expected from our baseline equation 2. Figure 7 shows the normalized
share price index and the employment rate for these countries.
Table 12.  Regressions Explaining Changes in Unemployment, 1980s and 1990s, with
Macroeconomic Shocks Including Share Pricesa
Estimated
Independent variable coefficient
Constant 2.33**
(2.29)
Average unemployment rate in the 1980s –0.01
(0.09)
Union density 0.29
(0.86)
Union coordination –3.97**
(2.46)
Nonwage support 33.58**
(2.08)
Trend productivity growth –0.37
(0.40)
Share price normalized by productivity –4.64**
(2.22)
R2 0.75
Adjusted R2 0.60
Source: Regression results from the equation described below.
a. The table shows regressions of the form
u90s – u80s = 	0 + 	1 u80s + 	2Y + ε,
where u90s is the average unemployment rate in the 1990s, u80s is the average rate in the 1980s, and Y is the set of explanatory
variables. t-statistics are in parentheses. ** denotes significance at the 5 percent level.
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In Spain the relationship is very clear. The fall in employment that
started around 1975 was preceded by a fall in real share prices. The per-
sistently low rate of employment after 1980 also corresponds to persis-
tently low real share prices.
In France the employment rate started its descent around the same time
as in Spain, although a slight fall can be seen as early as the late 1960s. A
fall in share prices preceded the drop in employment to a lower plateau.
However, an important difference with Spain has arisen in recent years.
Since 1985 the French stock market has recovered much of its lost ground.
Its value in 1998 was not much different from that found in the early 1970s
when the data are normalized by productivity. But the employment rate has
not recovered significantly. This implies either that the stock market was
overvalued in the 1990s or that the country is in a disequilibrium slump,
with the rate of unemployment exceeding the natural rate. 
270 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2000
96
95
94
93
92
1.6
1.4
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Percent Index
Figure 6.  Normalized Share Prices and the Employment Rate in the United States, 
1960–99
Source: Interational Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various issues; OECD Employment Outlook, various 
issues.
a. Share prices are normalized to productivity.
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German employment started its descent slightly later. It fell sharply in
the first halves of the 1970s and the 1980s and then again in the 1990s.
This fall was preceded by falling share prices. As in France, however, the
further fall in the 1990s is not explained by a further fall in share prices.
Share prices recovered some of their lost ground in the latter part of the
1980s, as did employment, but then held their ground through the 1990s,
when employment declined somewhat.
Italy shares the time pattern of France and Germany to a large extent.
Both real share prices (again normalized by productivity) and the rate of
employment were on a downward trend from the mid-1960s up to 1980.
The continued rise in unemployment after 1980 can be interpreted as, ini-
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Figure 7.  Normalized Share Prices and Employment Rates in France, Germany, Italy, 
and Spain, 1960–99a
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various issues; OECD Employment Outlook, various 
issues.
a. Share prices are normalized to productivity.
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tially, a delayed response to the earlier fall in asset valuations reflected in
stock market prices, and then, in the 1990s, as a result of the restrictive
monetary policy that preceded the establishment of the single currency.
Ireland, the Netherlands, and New Zealand
Finally, we show in figure 8 three of the recent good performers among
the OECD’s success stories: Ireland, the Netherlands, and New Zealand
have all had rising employment in the past five years or so. Share prices
rose prior to the recent rise in employment. Although this is in no way con-
clusive evidence for our thesis, it is a much-overlooked fact that supports
our hypothesis about the role of asset prices in employment determination. 
Granger Causality Tests
The long-run relationship between share prices and the rate of employ-
ment is consistent with our model. Of course, many other models would
find stock price variations to be positively related to measures of economic
expansion such as changes in employment. One departure of our model
from the main alternatives—such as variants of the Keynesian model—
involves the treatment of labor as a quasi-fixed asset. In our model, firms
step up hiring when they become more optimistic about future profitabil-
ity, even when they do not want to step up their current output and must
decrease it to train more workers. In models where labor can be hired and
fired at little cost, changes in employment coincide with changes in output.
Another difference is that, in Keynesian models with a fixed natural rate of
unemployment or a fixed Phillips curve, changes in employment should be
positively correlated with inflation, and, in principle, inflation changes or
levels would explain the movements in employment.
We first test explicitly whether changes in share prices precede changes
in the unemployment rate. For this we perform a Granger causality test
on the raw unemployment and share price series.  Table 13 presents the
results. The results using the raw series indicate that increases in share
prices do cause decreases in the unemployment rate in all the countries,
although the level of significance is low for France. 
The results so far are consistent both with models that treat labor as a
fixed asset and with those that do not. Therefore the next step is to regress
changes in unemployment on changes in output (to take out the contem-
poraneous effect of expanded capacity utilization on employment) and
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then to take the residual change in unemployment (the corrected unem-
ployment series in table 13) and test whether this is preceded by changes
in real share prices. The last two columns of table 13 report results for
this corrected unemployment series. These are consistent with the earlier
results. Thus the relationship between increases in share prices and
decreases in unemployment remains qualitatively unchanged by this cor-
rection for the business cycle. 
On the basis of this evidence we conclude that firms increase their hir-
ing of new workers when real share prices rise, reflecting enhanced opti-
mism about future profitability, and that this is independent of current
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Figure 8.  Normalized Share Prices and Employment Rate in Ireland, the Netherlands,
and New Zealand, 1960–99a
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various issues; OECD Employment Outlook, various 
issues.
a. Share prices are normalized to productivity.
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output changes. In other words, the hiring of new workers involves an
investment dimension.
Since investment in physical capital may also be a function of shadow
prices (that is, Tobin’s Q, which is a ratio of qk to replacement cost), it is
instructive to take a brief glance at the relationship between unemployment
and physical investment at frequencies lower than that of the business
cycle. We should note that Tobin’s theory has fallen into some disrepute
due to its apparent empirical failures. However, with our own forward-
looking model of investment in new workers, it is tempting to compare the
predictions of the two models. Figure A5 in appendix A juxtaposes the rate
of investment per unit capital and the employment rate for the G-7 coun-
tries except Japan. Although the high-frequency correlations come as no
surprise, there is also a decade-to-decade correlation in France, Italy, and
Germany: low-employment epochs tend also to be epochs of low invest-
ment rates. This finding is not to be expected from conventional theory.
Moreover, the turning points in the unemployment series often corre-
spond to the turning points in the rate of investment. Note that although the
rise of unemployment to a higher plateau in the three unemployment-prone
countries in the figure corresponds to a fall in the rate of investment to a
lower plateau, both unemployment and the investment rate show no such
behavior in the United States or the United Kingdom. These low-
frequency correlations can be taken as providing some empirical support
for Tobin’s theory or our theory or both.
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Table 13.  Granger Causality Tests of Changes in Share Prices and Changes in 
Unemploymenta
Corrected
Raw series unemployment
No. of
Country observations F Probability F Probability
France 36 1.47 0.23 2.22 0.15
Germany 36 3.93* 0.06 1.73 0.20
Ireland 36 11.88** 0.00 9.17* 0.00
Italy 36 3.46* 0.07 2.83* 0.10
Netherlands 36 10.52** 0.00 9.00** 0.01
New Zealand 32 5.87** 0.02 6.78* 0.01
Spain 36 3.43* 0.07 2.27 0.14
United States 36 14.12** 0.00 9.79* 0.00
Source: Authors’ calculations using OECD data for 1960–98.
a. The null hypothesis is that changes in real share prices do not cause changes in unemployment in the following quarter. The
“Raw series” columns report a test using the raw unemployment series. The “Corrected unemployment” columns report a test
using residuals from a regression of the first difference of unemployment on changes in the logarithm of real GDP. * indicates rejec-
tion of the null hypothesis at the 10 percent level, and ** rejection at the 5 percent level.
Conclusions
Our perspective on the natural rate of unemployment in any market
economy is that, to begin with, it shifts. It shifts with the economy’s
demographics, of course, and with the economy’s institutions: tax and reg-
ulatory law, corporate ownership and governance, and welfare state pro-
tections and provisions. But the natural rate does not just shift. Rather, it
fluctuates as a result of business shocks that disturb firms’ asset valuations,
productivity, and wealth. An advantage of our models is that entrepre-
neurs’ expectations about the future—say, future productivity, and hence
future profits or future interest rates—enter the story through their impact
on the valuations of the types of business assets in which firms invest,
and these valuations in turn disturb product and labor markets. In our past
empirical work we estimated that several market variables had unequal
unemployment effects among the countries, and we sought to trace these
disparities to institutional differences.
The unusual record of the 1990s permits us to go a great deal further 
in testing this framework. The impetus for the tests performed here is a
three-part hypothesis. First, managers’ asset valuations have a sufficiently
strong impact on the structural equilibrium unemployment path that the
two wide swings in economic activity observed in recent decades—the
gathering slump that began in the mid-1970s and the powerful recovery
seen in several economies in the 1990s—may very well be the effect of
swings in those managerial valuations. Second, the decline and rise in mar-
ket capitalizations of firms may be a serviceable mirror, even if only in a
distorted or exaggerated way, of the asset valuations made by firms’ man-
agers.43 Third, the 1990s rise in managerial valuations and the accompa-
nying rise in the stock market went far beyond what can be explained by
the capital market and other macroeconomic influences contained in our
empirical work, such as world real interest rates and domestic productivity
growth rates. Thus, in this instance (and possibly others), the rise in 
the stock market may have considerable information value when added to
the set of macroeconomic explanatory factors in the study of employ-
ment. It may be a sign of managers’ expectations of a one-time future lift
in the path of productivity, and hence of profits, that is distinct from and
43. The first of these statements is a substantive thesis in Phelps (1994), and the second
is the hypothesis explored in Phelps (1999).
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additive to any perceived improvement in the trend growth rate of
productivity.
This paper begins our testing of this hypothesis. We first showed that an
out-of-sample simulation of the 1990s with a stripped-down version of our
previous unemployment equations provides some explanation of the recov-
eries, where they occurred, since many of them coincided with a quicken-
ing of domestic productivity growth, and there has been some decline in
our world real interest rate series. Yet this simulation cannot fully explain
the degree of recovery observed in the more successful economies of the
past decade. We then showed that the labor market reforms advocated by
the OECD Secretariat, although helpful in some cases, leave us far short of
explaining why the countries that recovered in the 1990s did so, and by the
amounts that they did. Yet, snatching victory from the jaws of defeat, we
went on to show that the supplementary use of a stock market indicator in
our unemployment equations aids enormously in accounting for the 1990s
recoveries.
This finding, we think, testifies to the importance of asset valuations in
the structuralist theory of employment—no matter whether stock market
prices are the prime mover driving firms to act, as hinted by Keynes and
argued by Tobin, or whether, as we are inclined to suppose, these prices are
more the effect of managers’ valuations of business assets, based on their
expectations of future profits and capital costs, than an influence on their
valuations. If our results are correct, the widespread impression that stock
markets have no explanatory value is mistaken. The forward-looking
Fisher-Tobin treatment of investing, whether in fixed capital or in employ-
ees and customers, pays off when embedded in an essentially nonmonetary
theory of employment and asset acquisition. Also striking is that the
emphasis on business confidence by such early students of business fluc-
tuations as Spiethof—the idea that beliefs about the future drive the econ-
omy through systems that need not be monetary—which had been lost
for a century, may now be on its way back. 
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A P P E N D I X  A
Table A1.  Rate of Growth of Labor Productivity in Nineteen OECD Countries 
Percent per year
Country 1961–65 1966–70 1971–75 1976–80 1981–85 1986–90 1991–95 1996–98
Australia 2.4 2.7 2.2 1.7 1.2 1.0 1.5 1.8
Austria 4.6 5.0 3.8 2.5 2.0 1.9 1.8 2.0
Belgium 4.0 4.1 3.6 2.5 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.7
Canada 2.1 1.7 1.5 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0
Denmark 2.7 2.4 1.7 1.1 1.0 1.3 1.9 1.8
Finland 4.3 4.3 3.3 2.2 2.3 2.7 2.8 2.6
France . . . 4.4 3.2 2.3 2.0 1.9 1.6 1.7
Germany 4.1 4.0 3.2 2.1 1.3 . . . . . . . . .
Ireland 3.7 4.4 4.3 3.5 3.3 3.5 3.9 4.6
Italy 6.4 5.2 3.5 2.4 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.8
Japan 8.3 7.3 5.0 3.0 2.5 2.4 1.5 0.6
Netherlands . . . 4.4 3.5 1.9 1.2 0.9 0.9 1.1
Norway 4.9 5.0 5.7 5.7 4.6 3.6 3.9 5.0
New Zealand 6.4 5.2 4.4 3.4 3.3 2.7 3.8 4.9
Portugal 6.4 6.9 6.8 5.6 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.7
Spain 7.9 5.5 4.2 3.1 2.6 2.2 1.8 1.1
Sweden 5.2 4.5 3.6 2.7 2.4 2.0 1.2 0.9
United Kingdom 2.7 2.9 2.3 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.5 1.5
United States 3.1 1.8 0.8 0.6 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, June 1999.
Table A2.  Changes in the Trend Rate of Growth of Labor Productivity in Nineteen OECD Countriesa
Percent per year
Country 1961–65 1966–70 1971–75 1976–80 1981–85 1986–90 1991–95 1996–98
Australia = = = ↓ = = ↑ ↑
Austria = ↑↑ ↓ ↓↓ ↓ = = =
Belgium = = ↓ ↓↓ ↓↓ = = =
Canada = = = ↓↓ = = = =
Denmark = ↓ ↓↓ ↓↓ = ↑ ↑↑ =
Finland = = ↓↓ ↓↓ = ↑↑ = =
France . . . = ↓↓ ↓↓ ↓↓ = = =
Germany = = ↓↓ ↓↓ ↓↓ . . . . . . . . .
Ireland = ↑↑ = ↓↓ = = ↑ ↑↑
Italy = ↓↓ ↓↓ ↓↓ ↓ = = =
Japan = ↓↓ ↓↓ ↓↓ ↓ = ↓↓ ↓
Netherlands . . . = ↓↓ ↓↓ ↓↓ ↓ = =
Norway = = ↑↑ = ↓↓ ↓↓ ↑ ↑↑
New Zealand = ↓↓ ↓↓ ↓↓ = ↓↓ ↑↑ ↑↑
Portugal = = = ↓↓ ↓↓ = = =
Spain = ↓↓ ↓↓ ↓↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓↓
Sweden = ↓↓ ↓↓ ↓↓ ↓ ↓ ↓↓ ↓
United Kingdom = = ↓↓ ↓ = ↓↓ = =
United States = ↓↓ ↓↓ ↓ ↑ = = =
a. =, change of less than 0.2 percentage point; ↑ (↓), increase (decrease) in excess of 0.2 percentage point; ↑↑ (↓↓), increase (decrease) in excess of 0.5 percentage point..
Table A3.  Regression Results for the Unconstrained Baseline Equationa
Lagged Real world Trend Coefficient on Nonwage
Constant unemployment interest rate productivity Oil prices price inflation supportb
Country (i) (i) (1) growth (2) (3) (i) (4)
Australia 2.09 0.77 0.06 –0.67 1.67 –4.91 . . .
(1.51) (8.61) (0.79) (–1.38) (1.46) (0.54
Austria 0.74 0.87 0.05 –0.14 0.16 –5.16 –0.81
(1.33) (12.54) (1.95) (1.51) (0.28) (1.58) (0.22)
Belgium 3.46 0.74 0.03 –0.77 3.17 –5.97 35.43
(2.16) (8.08) (0.39) (2.15) (3.87) (1.02) (2.82)
Canada 4.71 0.55 0.08 –1.45 1.58 –21.27 15.37
(3.49) (5.65) (1.22) (2.70) (1.46) (2.03) (1.90)
Denmark 0.55 0.93 –0.12 –0.12 2.35 –12.49 –25.01
(0.46) (12.06) (1.34) (0.26) (1.50) (1.35) (3.29)
Finland 2.19 0.57 0.09 –0.32 1.05 –7.16 36.58
(1.10) (7.53) (1.12) (0.72) (0.45) (0.89) (3.70)
France 2.72 0.78 0.11 –0.54 0.63 0.43 35.05
(2.62) (11.25) (2.24) (2.55) (0.92) (0.09) (4.10)
Germany 0.46 0.84 –0.01 –0.10 2.40 –19.80 4.41
(0.79) (16.71) (0.17) (0.78) (3.10) (2.19) (0.72)
Ireland 3.29 0.83 0.12 –0.72 3.73 –0.13 –11.28
(1.47) (15.45) (1.38) (1.49) (2.77) (0.02) (0.89)
Italy 2.20 0.80 0.13 –0.27 –0.66 –4.52 7.17
(2.60) (12.69) (2.70) (2.40) (0.83) (1.20) (2.49)
Japan 0.80 0.79 0.001 –0.07 –0.14 –2.64 –2.04
(3.12) (9.54) (0.13) (3.20) (0.78) (2.82) (0.83)
Netherlands –0.72 0.81 0.10 0.15 4.58 –2.46 29.01
(1.09) (10.70) (1.55) (0.95) (4.88) (0.52) (3.54)
(continued)
Table A3.  (continued)
Lagged Real world Trend Coefficient on Nonwage
Constant unemployment interest rate productivity Oil prices price inflation supportb
Country (i) (i) (1) growth (2) (3) (i) (4)
New Zealand 2.08 0.86 0.06 –0.39 –0.12 –0.66 39.19
(2.20) (12.94) (0.93) (2.32) (0.11) (0.29) (1.93)
Norway 4.00 0.80 0.11 –0.70 1.25 –9.95 26.22
(4.99) (13.73) (2.75) (4.87) (2.75) (2.83) (6.31)
Portugal 0.33 0.60 0.08 0.26 1.42 –5.87 5.13
(0.22) (5.16) (0.89) (1.35) (0.85) (1.34) (0.60)
Spain 0.67 0.85 0.21 –0.14 5.87 –6.51 19.51
(0.56) (13.29) (1.64) (0.80) (4.48) (0.76) (2.02)
Sweden 1.11 0.83 0.08 –0.18 –0.78 –1.53 –10.61
(1.40) (10.17) (1.55) (1.27) (0.85) (0.28) (2.23)
United Kingdom 1.20 0.64 0.20 –0.43 6.07 –0.93 1.94
(1.25) (8.35) (2.57) (1.25) (6.44) (0.19) (0.22)
United States 2.82 0.51 –0.11 –0.23 3.23 –30.78 2.27
(4.68) (5.27) (2.48) (1.53) (3.15) (3.12) (0.52) 
Source: Authors’ regressions from equation 1 in the text, using data for 1960–98.
a.  t-statistics are in parentheses.
b.  The equation was first estimated omitting nonwage support because of its limited duration in some of the countries. The first six columns report these results. This column reports the coefficient of
nonwage support when that variable was added to the equation.
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a. Defined as r* – g, or the world real interest rate minus the expected long-term growth rate of labor productivity.
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A P P E N D I X  B   
Deriving the Role of Productivity and Tax Rates
THE LOGIC of the derivation of the compound variable involving labor pro-
ductivity and labor tax rates is as follows. The model can be viewed as
determining the labor cost per employee, called “the wage to employers,”
as a ratio to productivity. Yet quitting behavior is a function of the wage
after payroll taxes and income tax, called “the wage to employees,”
expressed as a ratio to income from private wealth. To disentangle this
knot one needs first to divide both numerator and denominator in the lat-
ter ratio by the ratio of the employee wage to the employer wage, which
makes the new numerator equal to the employer wage. One next divides
both the new numerator and the new denominator by productivity, so that
the employer wage in the numerator appears as a ratio to productivity, as
desired. The final denominator is then income from private wealth as a
ratio to productivity times the ratio of the employee wage to the employer
wage. That is equal to nonwage income multiplied by the ratio of the
employer wage to the employee wage and divided by productivity.
A P P E N D I X  C    
A Dynamic System Underpinning the Hypothesized Asset 
Price–Employment Link
A SIMPLE DYNAMIC SYSTEM to back the story in figure 4 is the open econ-
omy in Hoon and Phelps and in Phelps.44 A closed economy would also
serve. Here, firms’ assets are their employees, who are costly to train.
There are rising marginal training costs. The real interest rate in terms of
the economy’s product is equal to the world real interest rate, r*, which is
taken to be fixed.
Output is an increasing function of “augmented” labor, 
t NPt , where 
t
denotes labor augmentation at time t and NPt denotes the number of 
employees engaged in production rather than training. We add fixed capi-
tal in a simple way by admitting imports of equipment on short-term lease
from overseas suppliers with zero transport costs. When employees move
from producing to training, they need the same equipment. The amount
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44. Hoon and Phelps (1992); Phelps (1994).
of capital per augmented employee, K/
t N, is determined by the demand
function, , which is decreasing in the given unit rental, r* + . Output 
per augmented employee allocated to production is given by f [ (r* + 
)], and the rental per augmented employee is (r* + ) (r* + ). Output
and rental per unaugmented production worker are 
t(r* + ) and 

t R(r* + ), respectively.
In this setting, each identical firm, to maximize shareholder value,
chooses the current hire rate, h, and its wage, v, to maximize a Hamilton-
ian function. That function involves the current proportion of employees
engaged in training per hiree, given by (h), which is an increasing func-
tion of h; the mortality rate, ; the quit rate, , which is a function of the
unemployment rate, u, of the current wage expected to be set at other firms
relative to its own wage, ve/v, and of income from private wealth, yW, as a
ratio to the wage; the shadow price the firm optimally awards itself for
every current employee, q; and its current stock of employees, N. The
current-value Hamiltonian is
The necessary conditions for a maximum give the relationships behind
figure 4 in the text. These three conditions together with the equilibrium
(correct-expectations) condition, v e = v, yield equations 1 through 3. It will
be convenient to write these equations in terms of the normalized wage,
v/
; the normalized shadow price, q/
; and normalized income from
private wealth, yW/
. This introduces the actual and expected growth rate
of 
, to be denoted .
For a maximum, q must satisfy the arbitrage equation
(C1)
This equation says that a capital gain (loss) is needed to make up any
shortfall (surplus) of the marginal profitability of employees, 
 [1 + h
(h) – (h) – R/ – v/
], over the economic interest and depreciation
entailed, which is q [ +  + r* – ].
The optimal wage balances the marginal benefit of a small increase in
the wage rate that results from the consequent reduction in the quit rate
against the marginal cost in terms of the payroll on existing employees of
the same small rise of the wage rate. This gives the condition
d q dt h h h R v
u y v r qW
Λ Λ
Λ Λ Λ
ϕ β β ϕ ϕ
ζ ϕ ϕ θ λ ϕ
( ) = − + ′( ) − ( ) − −[ ]
+ − ( ) ( )[ ] + + −{ }
1
1 , .*
Λ Λ Λt t t
e W
r h r R r v
q h u v v y v N
ϕ δ β ϕ δ δ
ζ θ
* *
, .
+( ) − ( ) +( ) − +( ) −(
+ − −( )[ ] −{ })
*
1
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(C2)
Here both the left-hand and the right-hand sides have been multiplied by
v/
 for typographical simplicity. The original right-hand side gives the
two effects on the quit rate of an increase in pay, both effects multiplied by
the normalized worth of the quits averted. The original left-hand side is
equal to one.
The optimum scale of current hiring is at the point where the cost of
speeding up by the amount of one new hire (as a ratio to the employee
stock) would be just worth the gain per unit time from adding employees
at that faster rate. The condition is (h) = q/
, which is convenient to
write in the form
(C3)
where (q/
) > 0. Using that, we have the equation of motion for
employment,
(C4)
where, without loss of generality, units are chosen such that N  1 – u.
The Stationary Loci
To obtain the asset price curve, which is the stationary locus for nor-
malized q in figure 4, we need only set the left-hand side of equation C1
equal to zero, use equation C3 to substitute for h, and use equation C2,
which implicitly gives v/
 as a function, say, Vs(1 – u, q/
; yW/
).
This gives the stationary locus:
(C5)
0 1
1
1 1
= − + ( ) ′ ( )[ ] − ( )[ ]{
− − −( )}
+ − ( ) −( )[ ]{
+ + − }
φ ϕ β φ ϕ β φ ϕ
ϕ ϕ ϕ
ζ ϕ ϕ ϕ
θ λ ϕ
q q q
R V u q y
u y V u q y
r q
S W
W S W
Λ Λ Λ
Λ Λ
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Λ
, ;
, , ;
.
*
dN dt q u y v uW= ( ) − − ( ) ( )[ ] −{ } −( )φ ϕ ζ ϕ ϕ θΛ Λ Λ1 1, ,
h q= ( )φ ϕΛ .
v q u u y v
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Given yW/
, the normalized share price can be shown to be decreasing
in 1 – u. With a standard Blanchard-Yaari formulation of the accumula-
tion of income from private wealth, Hoon and Phelps show that the long-
run relationship is also negatively sloped.
To obtain the employment curve we proceed similarly, setting the left-
hand side equal to zero and again using equation C2 to substitute VS(1 – u,
q/
; yW/
) for v/
. This gives the stationary locus
(C6)
Given yW/
, the employment variable can be shown to be increasing in
the normalized shadow price. Again, with a Blanchard-Yaari formulation,
the long-run relationship is also positively sloped.
Dynamics
A common shortcut in analyzing dynamic systems takes the slower-
moving of the two state variables, here the income from private wealth vari-
able, to be temporarily constant and analyzes the dynamics of the faster-
moving variable, employment, accordingly. Here, this subsystem is simply
equations C1 and C4, after making the substitutions for v and h from equa-
tions C2 and C3:
(C7)
(C8)
Analysis of this medium-run system gives the equilibrium motion along
a negatively sloped saddle path leading (from either side) to the intersec-
tion of the asset price curve and the employment curve corresponding to
the given yW/
, dubbed here the medium-term rest point.
d u dt q
u y V u q y uW S W
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1 1 1
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One kind of shock to this system is a sudden increase in the expected
rate of labor augmentation, . Analysis of this system yields the intuitive
result that such a shift of  generates an upward shift of both the asset price
curve and the saddle path, hence a jump in the normalized share price,
followed by a gradual sinking of that variable to its higher medium-term
rest point value and a gradual rise of employment toward its likewise
higher medium-term rest point value. 
Even if real-life economies fluctuated only up and down this saddle
path, there might be a reason to add a normalized stock market indicator to
the employment growth equation. Such an indicator could serve as a proxy
for omitted asset stocks, such as customers and even fixed capital, which is
rarely well measured.
The shock highlighted in figure 4 brings out the major value added of
a stock market indicator. This shock is a sudden anticipation of a one-
time shift at a future date in the path of productivity and thus of profits
per unit of assets. That shock requires a difficult analysis with respect to
the aftermath of the shock, since the quantum jump in productivity, once it
actually occurs, has a quantum effect on the wealth-to-productivity ratio,
and therefore that ratio can no longer be held constant for analytical sim-
plicity. But our interest is only in the existence of an expansion phase fol-
lowing the sudden anticipation of the future productivity shift. The
reasoning behind our conclusions that the asset price immediately jumps
and that employment, if initially steady, will then be rising until the
moment of the productivity shift appears inescapable. In such a bubble
scenario, a normalized stock market indicator can serve to pick up the
expectation of the future parameter shift—in our example, the productiv-
ity shift.
A P P E N D I X  D    
Share Prices and Company Employment
THIS APPENDIX ANALYZES company data for Canada (companies in the
Toronto Stock Exchange index), France (the CAC40), Germany 
(the DAX), Italy (the Milan Stock Exchange index), the United Kingdom
(the FT index), and the United States (the Dow Jones Industrial Average).
290 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2000
This has the advantage of looking at changes in employment over time
for units that share the same macroeconomic environment. We then test for
the effect of real share prices pS and profits (net profit margin, pr) on
growth in employment (N). In addition, we allow employment growth to
be affected by the change in the growth rate of nominal GDP, Y, which
proxies for (macroeconomic) demand shocks. We estimate for each of the
countries an equation of the form:
(D1)
where τ denotes a company-specific fixed effect. The results for the period
1987–98 are reported in table D1.
Notice that the real share price is significant and correctly signed in all
countries except Italy, whereas the profit margin is significant only in
Canada. The demand shock is both correctly signed and significant only in
Germany and Italy; it is incorrectly signed in Canada and the United
Kingdom.
∆ ∆N
N
p pr Yit
it
i t
S
it it it= + + + +τ α α α ε1 2 3 2log ,
Table D1.  Regression Results Using Company Dataa
United United
Independent variable Canada France Germany Italy Kingdom States
Logarithm of the real share price 0.12 0.03 0.02 –0.01 0.14 0.06
(not normalized) (3.36) (2.09) (1.56) (0.87) (2.87) (3.01)
Net profit margin 0.29 –0.16 –0.06 –0.00 –0.59 0.07
(1.89) (0.78) (0.14) (0.17) (1.11) (0.34)
Change in the growth rate of –1.23 0.16 0.20 0.42 –1.72 0.44
nominal GDP (2.14) (0.57) (1.74) (1.95) (1.44) (0.85)
Source: Data from Hoover’s Online and Datastream.
a. The dependent variable is employment growth in a sample of companies in the country in question. t-statistics are in
parentheses.
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Comments and
Discussion
Olivier Blanchard: This is an ambitious paper.1 It extends the general
framework developed by Edmund Phelps and a number of coauthors in the
past, and it reexamines the evolution of unemployment in the OECD coun-
tries over the past forty years. It then offers a new mechanism through
which the emergence of the “new economy” may be affecting equilib-
rium unemployment. Finally, it examines whether this new mechanism can
indeed explain the declines in unemployment observed in a number of
OECD countries in the 1990s. My comments will follow a parallel struc-
ture, starting with a discussion of the general framework, then turning to
a discussion of the new mechanism, and finally offering my own interpre-
tation of the decline in unemployment in two countries, Ireland and the
Netherlands. 
The emerging consensus. A reading of this and other recent papers on
the evolution of unemployment reveals the emergence of a broad consen-
sus—good news after some thirty years of research on the increase in 
European unemployment. The consensus focuses on the joint role of
shocks and institutions and on their interactions. It goes roughly as 
follows.  
Far from being an immutable constant, the natural rate of unemploy-
ment (also called the NAIRU, or the structural rate, or the equilibrium rate;
the semantics are far from settled here) moves in response to shocks. Labor
market institutions also matter. They do so directly, by affecting the under-
1. I thank Justin Wolfers for useful discussions.
lying mean to which the natural rate eventually returns. Also, and more
important, they do so by affecting the size and the persistence of move-
ments in the natural rate in response to shocks. 
This consensus encompasses many approaches that were once seen as
largely incompatible, for example: 
—The work by Michael Bruno and Jeffrey Sachs,2 which focused on
the effects of adverse oil and productivity shocks and their interaction with
real and nominal wage rigidities. For example, the effect of an increase in
the price of oil on the natural rate of unemployment is likely to depend
on whether wage negotiations are centralized or decentralized. Centralized
negotiations make it easier to coordinate a slowdown in wages in response
to an aggregate shock. 
—The work by Phelps himself on structural slumps,3 which resulted in
a model of the labor market based on imperfections on both the supply and
the demand sides. Phelps used this approach to look at the effects of a
number of shocks on unemployment. The argument developed in this
paper is an example of how this approach can be used to think about move-
ments in unemployment. The authors of this paper argue that, in a num-
ber of countries, the desire of firms to build a consumer base and a pool
of trained workers for the future has led them to increase hiring at a given
real wage, leading to a decline in unemployment today. 
—The work by Lawrence Summers and myself on hysteresis,4 which
focused on the persistence of deviations of the unemployment rate from its
mean. Our initial focus was on the objective function of the employed
workers and its effect on bargaining outcomes. Under the influence of
Richard Layard and Stephen Nickell, in particular, this line of research has
increasingly focused on the role of the unemployed and, in particular, of
long-term unemployment, in wage determination. If, for example, labor
market institutions lead to unemployment characterized by individual
spells of long duration, the risk that sustained high unemployment will 
lead to the disenfranchising of the long-term unemployed and, by impli-
cation, low upward pressure on wages and a slow decrease in unemploy-
ment, is higher. Our initial focus was on the persistent effects of shifts in
aggregate demand on unemployment. But the argument extends to the
2. Bruno and Sachs (1985).
3. Phelps (1994).
4. Blanchard and Summers (1986).
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effects of any shock that increases unemployment, from oil to productivity
shocks. 
This broad “consensus” approach has proved useful in describing trends
in unemployment across the OECD countries over the last forty or so
years. Let me briefly review what has been done, what has been learned,
and how the specification offered in this paper relates to other specifica-
tions in the literature. 
Denote the unemployment rate in country i in year t by uit. Denote the
vector of measures of shocks and the vector of measures of institutions in
country i in year t by Sit and Iit, respectively. 
A generic specification would allow uit to depend on current and lagged
values of Sit, of Iit, and of terms capturing interactions between each shock
in Sit and each institution in Iit.  Obviously, this is far too much to ask of 
the data. Thus the specifications explored in recent papers must be seen
and evaluated as rough shortcuts to this more appealing, but unattainable,
specification. 
One of the first specifications along these lines was offered by Phelps.5
It took the form
uit = ci + bi uit – 1 + (Sit)di + εit,
where  is a vector of coefficients of the same dimension as the vector of
shocks, and ci, bi, and di are scalars. 
The unemployment variable was allowed to depend on its own lagged
value and on a number of variables capturing “shocks,” from oil prices, to
tax changes, to changes in government debt. (The list was somewhat dif-
ferent from that in the present paper. In particular, it did not include pro-
ductivity growth, to which this paper assigns a large role.) Institutions
were not explicitly introduced in the specification, but the constant term ci,
the effects of a given vector of shocks di, and the degree of persistence bi
were all allowed to have country-specific values, capturing implicitly the
role of different institutions in different countries. The estimated response
of the natural rate to shocks was smallest in Japan and the United States,
and strongest in the Netherlands and Germany. 
In a recent paper, Justin Wolfers and I offered an alternative specifica-
tion in which we explicitly allowed for shocks, institutions, and interac-
tions.6 Our basic specification took the form
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5. Phelps (1994).
6. Blanchard and Wolfers (2000).
u–it = c(Xit) + (Sit) d(Xit) + εit.
Our specification differed from the Phelps specification in two ways.
First, we forced the constant and the effect of a given vector of shocks—
ci and di, respectively, in Phelps’s specification—to be linear functions of
our measures of labor market institutions. Second, because we were skep-
tical that we could separately estimate the effect of institutions on both
the size and the dynamic effects of shocks on unemployment, we estimated
a static specification using five-year averages, rather than a dynamic speci-
fication with annual data as Phelps had done. We found that our measures
of shocks—in particular, measures of productivity growth, of real interest
rates, and of labor hoarding (more on this below)—could account for the
general evolution of unemployment over the last thirty years. We also
found that labor market institutions could account for differences in the
response of unemployment to shocks across countries. The effect of
shocks on the natural rate was weakest in Japan and the United States and
strongest in Spain. Higher employment protection and a longer duration of
unemployment benefits both led to larger effects of shocks on the natural
rate. Time variation in institutions did not seem to help in explaining the
evolution of unemployment. 
The present paper does what we had shied away from doing. It attempts
to estimate the separate effect of institutions on the size and the persistence
of the effects of shocks on unemployment. Although the authors estimate
their equation in two steps (first obtaining country-specific coefficients,
then regressing these coefficients on institutions), we can think of their
specification as being of the form: 
uit = c(Xit) + b(Xit)uit – 1 + (Sit) d(Xit) + εit,
This specification is clearly more appealing than ours. It is obviously
still far short of what one would want, however. Different shocks are likely
to have different dynamic effects on unemployment, some building up
before decreasing, others decreasing from the start. Some institutions
may have a strong impact on the effects of some shocks on unemployment,
but not on the effects of others. The authors’ specification allows for nei-
ther of these differences. Even so the specification may be asking more of
the data than the data can tell. I did not have access to the authors’ data
set in time to explore the robustness of their results. But based on an explo-
ration using the data set from Blanchard and Wolfers, some of the results
do not appear very robust. In particular, the ability of the data to clearly
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separate the impact of institutions on the size versus the persistence of
the effects of shocks is limited.  
In short, something has been learned from these panel data regressions,
namely, the fact that one can give a good statistical account of the evolu-
tion of OECD unemployment rates as a function of shocks, institutions,
and their interactions. This was not obvious ex ante. My reading of the
results from this and other papers goes roughly as follows: 
—As to shocks: the slowdown in productivity growth that started in
the 1970s, the movements in oil prices, and the downs and ups of 
real interest rates clearly have played a role in the overall evolution of the
natural rate of unemployment. 
—As to institutions: some labor market institutions appear to lead to
larger or longer effects of shocks on unemployment. Among these, the
duration of unemployment benefits, the decentralization of wage negotia-
tions, and the degree of employment protection appear to be the most
important.  
It should be clear, however, that only so much can be learned from 
such panel data unemployment regressions. What specific shocks and
what specific institutions matter, and how and why they matter, are prob-
ably beyond the confines of what we can learn from such an empirical
exercise. Progress must come from looking at a broader set of macro-
economic implications, a broader set of variables, and tighter, less agnos-
tic, specifications. 
Indeed, within this broad consensus, many unanswered questions
remain. I shall focus on three of these, all of them triggered by the results
of this paper. 
First, a usual finding, confirmed by the results presented in the paper’s
table 1, is that changes in productivity growth appear to play an impor-
tant role in explaining the evolution of the natural rate of unemployment.
The initial increase in unemployment in the 1970s was associated with a
decrease in the underlying rate of total factor productivity growth. Recent
decreases in unemployment, for example in Ireland, or most recently in the
United States, appear to be due in part to faster productivity growth. The
question is why. 
The authors of this paper argue that productivity growth matters
through the user cost of capital. The true cost of capital is equal, they
argue, to the real interest rate minus the rate of productivity growth. The
slower that growth, the higher the user cost. I am skeptical of this inter-
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pretation on both theoretical and empirical grounds. On theoretical
grounds, the argument appears to rely on disembodied technological
progress, so that the marginal product of a given machine increases with
overall productivity over time. This is probably not a good assumption. On
empirical grounds, the fact that the coefficient on g is consistently three
to five times larger in absolute value than the coefficient on r in their table 1
suggests that more is at work than just the effect of (r – g). 
My own interpretation, which is far from original, is that, when under-
lying total factor productivity growth slows down, it takes some time for
both workers and firms to adjust to the new reality. During that time, wages
rise too fast relative to total factor productivity growth, leading to a
decrease in employment, both directly and through lower profits and lower
capital accumulation. The exact nature of this channel, what it depends on,
and how long it takes for aspirations to become consistent with reality,
remain, however, largely unexplored issues. 
Second, another typical finding, also present in the authors’ table 1, is
that real interest rates appear to play an important role in accounting for the
evolution of the natural rate of unemployment. (This stylized fact was more
controversial ten years ago. It now seems widely accepted.) In these panel
data regressions, high real interest rates are the main explanator of why the
natural rate of unemployment remained high in Europe in the 1980s. My pre-
ferred explanation is that high real interest rates lead to a higher user cost,
which leads to lower capital accumulation, which in turn leads to lower
employment. There are other possible explanations, for example the idea
(also explored by Phelps7) that the real interest rate affects the desired markup
of firms, and in turn equilibrium unemployment. I find these less persuasive. 
On both econometric and conceptual grounds, however, the question
arises of where these movements in real interest rates come from.
Whether they come from shifts in the demand for capital, or from shifts in
the supply of capital, surely has different implications for the evolution of
unemployment. If they come largely from shifts in monetary policy—as
seems plausible during a period characterized by disinflation policies, the
creation of the euro, and so on—does this not imply that monetary pol-
icy can have long-lasting effects, not only on the deviation of the actual
unemployment rate from the natural rate but also on the natural rate
itself? Again, this is an important issue, on which there is surprisingly
7. Phelps (1994).
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little work. (This line of argument is related, but not identical, to the study
by Laurence Ball of the effects of aggregate demand on unemployment in
the long run.8)
Third, it is ironic (or perhaps not) that, even as we are starting to have
a coherent story for what happened in the 1970s and the 1980s, the 1990s
remain largely a mystery. It is hard to believe that, by the early 1990s, aspi-
ration wages had not adjusted to lower productivity growth. And since
the crisis in the European monetary system of the early 1990s, real interest
rates have declined. Both these factors should have led to lower unem-
ployment. Yet in most (but not all) countries, unemployment remained
high for most of the 1990s. Only in the last couple of years have most
countries started to see unemployment decline. With these questions in
mind, let me turn to the second issue I want to take up, namely, the tenta-
tive explanation for the evolution of unemployment in the 1990s offered in
the present paper. 
The new economy and unemployment. In an attempt to explain why
unemployment had remained high during the 1990s, I offered, in a 1997
Brookings Paper, my own “mystery shock.”9 From the large decrease in
the labor share in a number of European countries, and the underlying
movements in capital, labor, and wages, I argued that, at least in conti-
nental Europe, we were seeing a decrease in labor hoarding, perhaps due
to a decrease in workers’ bargaining power. This dishoarding, I argued,
explained both why unemployment remained high and why profits were
sharply increasing. I ventured to forecast that the effects of such dishoard-
ing would eventually be favorable for employment: higher profits would
lead to higher capital accumulation, and higher employment down the
road. Three years later, with unemployment indeed coming down, I still
believe that basic argument. 
Focusing more on the recent declines in unemployment, the authors of
this paper offer a different “mystery shock,” namely, the anticipation of a
bright economic future leading to lower unemployment today. This is the
time, their argument goes, for firms to invest in and train workers and to
invest in a large consumer base. This means being willing to charge a low
price (to attract customers) or to pay a high wage (to attract workers). In
both cases this translates into a favorable shift in labor demand: at a given
level of employment, firms are willing to pay a higher real product wage,
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8. Ball (1999).
9. Blanchard (1997).
either because they are willing to charge low prices, or because they are
willing to pay high nominal wages. It is this favorable shift in demand
that is leading to a decrease in unemployment. 
The argument is clear. But is it plausible, and are the effects large
enough to account for the declines in unemployment we have observed? I
remain skeptical. 
Consider the argument that firms want to hire workers today so as to
have time to train them and have them ready when demand will be higher.
This makes sense only if the skills the workers are going to acquire are
firm specific. Otherwise, trained workers will always extract their full mar-
ginal product, and there is no point for a particular firm in hiring and train-
ing them today. Are the skills required of the new economy highly firm
specific? Although I know of no hard evidence, anecdotal evidence seems
to point the other way. To draw on our own experience as employers, the
widespread adoption of computer programs such as Word and Excel makes
it much easier to hire temporary workers and get them up to speed than in
the past. Perhaps more convincing, the wage differential between skilled
and unskilled workers, which had increased steadily for at least twenty
years in the United States, has stopped growing since roughly 1995, that is,
before the “new economy” started occupying the scene. The timing is not
good for the hypothesis. 
I find more attractive the idea that some firms have become more eager
to create and extend their customer bases. After all, many e-commerce
firms sell their products at a zero price; equivalently, their product wage
is infinite. The goal of these firms is clearly to develop a customer base,
from which they hope to extract profits in the future. This is, however,
clearly true only for a small segment of the economy, and the empirical
issue is how large a shift in labor demand this can generate. I am skepti-
cal that it can explain enough. 
The paper provides supporting evidence in the form of Granger causal-
ity tests, showing that movements in stock prices help predict decreases in
unemployment. Such evidence is indeed consistent with their story, but it
hardly settles the issue. Most of the factors that might lead to a decrease in
unemployment are likely to be associated with an increase in stock values,
and because the stock market is forward looking, this increase is likely to
take place long before the full decrease in unemployment. 
An implication of the authors’ theory, which may help differentiate it
from any theory in which good news about the future leads to more out-
put and employment today, has to do with the behavior of labor produc-
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tivity. According to their theory, firms hire workers in anticipation of
higher demand in the future, and this leads to a decline in current labor
productivity. Stock price increases should therefore be associated with a
decrease in labor productivity for some time. In this light, the evidence in
table 13, in which the authors show that stock prices “cause” (in the sense
of the Granger test) the residual from a regression of unemployment on
output, is intriguing. The sign of the Granger causation and the shape of
the estimated relation are not reported, however, so it is difficult to assess
this evidence, but this is clearly worth pursuing in future work. 
Ireland and the Netherlands. Two countries that have seen a dramatic
decline in their unemployment rate over the last fifteen years are Ireland
and the Netherlands. In Ireland the unemployment rate, which stood at 
17 percent in 1986, now stands below 6 percent. In the Netherlands the
unemployment rate has come down from 11 percent in 1983 to less than
3 percent today. Can we explain what happened in these two countries, and
how does it relate to the analysis presented in this paper? 
In both cases the proximate cause of the decrease in unemployment is
not hard to find. Take first a short theoretical detour. Recall that, for an
economy to grow along a balanced path, the rate of real wage growth
must be equal to the rate of technological progress, which we can compute
by constructing the Solow residual for each year and dividing it by the
share of labor. Call the rate of technological progress the rate of war-
ranted wage growth. What has happened in both countries is that, starting
in the mid-1980s, actual wage growth has remained below warranted wage
growth. This is shown in the top panel of figure 1 below for Ireland, and
in the top panel of figure 2 for the Netherlands. In each figure the solid line
in the top panel depicts the logarithm of the real wage since 1969 (that is,
the integral of actual real wage growth since 1969). The dashed line shows
the logarithm of the warranted real wage (that is, the integral of warranted
real wage growth since 1969) over the same period.  Both log variables are
normalized to zero in 1969. Both figures show how wages, which had
increased above warranted wages in the 1970s, turned around in the early
1980s and have remained consistently lower than warranted wages since
then. 
One would expect such wage moderation to have two effects over time.
The first is to increase profits and investment. The second is to lead firms to
increase the ratio of labor to capital in their production. This is indeed
exactly what one observes in the data, as the bottom panels of figures 1 
300 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2000
and 2 show. These graphs show, as the dashed line, the trends in the real
wage relative to the warranted real wage (more specifically, the log of the
real wage minus the log of the warranted real wage, w – w*). They also
show, as the solid line, the trends in the ratio of employment—adjusted for
technological progress—to capital (more specifically, the log of employ-
ment minus the log of the warranted real wage, minus the log 
of the capital stock, n – w* – k). In both countries, firms, which  moved
away from labor in the 1970s, turned around in the mid-1980s. Since the
mid-1980s, higher capital accumulation and a higher labor-capital ratio
have both led to a steady increase in employment and a steady decrease in
unemployment. 
One might wonder whether the pattern in figures 1 and 2 is specific to
those countries that have succeeded. The answer appears to be yes. As an
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Figure 1. Ireland: Actual and Warranted Real Wages and Employment-Capital 
Ratio, 1969–94
Source: Author's calculations using data from the OECD Business Letter database.
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example, figure 3 shows the corresponding time series for France. There,
wage moderation (real wages lying below warranted real wages) starts
later and has been more limited. There is no evidence of a turnaround in
the labor-capital ratio. (The French data end in 1995. Preliminary work
with more recent data does show a turnaround, and unemployment has
indeed started decreasing.) 
All this is good news, as it tells us that the underlying mechanisms that
we believe should have been at work have indeed been at work. Wage
moderation has led to more employment, more profits, more capital, and
eventually more employment. (It also means, however, that the specific
mechanism emphasized by the present paper is not the key to the decrease
in unemployment in Ireland and the Netherlands. If it were, we would see
high wages, not low wages. But I do not think that the authors would push
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Source: Author's calculations using data from the OECD Business Letter database.
this interpretation anyway, given that the turnaround in both countries
dates back to the mid-1980s.) The next step, however, is to go back from
wage moderation to more fundamental causes. And there the two countries
seem quite different. 
In Ireland, the story seems to come from a combination of an unusu-
ally high rate of technological progress, on the one hand, and wage
moderation coming from the high integration of the Irish and U.K. labor
markets, on the other. As can be inferred by comparing the vertical scales
in figures 1 and 2, technological progress has been much greater in Ireland;
this appears to be due in large part to the direct and indirect effects of for-
eign direct investment. At the same time, high labor mobility between the
United Kingdom and Ireland has limited wage growth in Ireland relative to
that in the United Kingdom, where productivity growth has been much
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Figure 3. France: Actual and Warranted Real Wages and Employment-Capital 
Ratio, 1969–95
Source: Author's calculations using data from the OECD Business Letter database.
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lower. My reading of the evidence is that this labor mobility, rather than
the social pacts signed from 1986 on, is the mechanism behind wage mod-
eration and the Irish miracle. For that reason, it is probably sui generis.
One cannot expect, for example, the same degree of wage moderation in
other European countries. 
The story of the Netherlands is more relevant for other European coun-
tries. It is also more confusing. Many explanations have been offered,
some of which are wrong. It is not the case, for example, that the fall in
unemployment hides a fall in the number of hours worked per worker;
the large increase in part-time employment that has indeed taken place in
the Netherlands has been associated with a corresponding increase in par-
ticipation rates.  My reading is that wage moderation in the Netherlands
is due in large part to social pacts in that country, in particular the 1982
Wassenaar agreement. That agreement is interesting to study. It would
seem to focus on all the wrong remedies to reduce high unemployment,
from subsidies for early retirement to a shorter workweek. In retrospect,
whether or not these measures made sense on their own, they appear to
have been the pills that facilitated wage moderation, and which have led to
the steady improvement in the labor market since. This makes for a com-
plex story, one that panel data regressions may have a hard time fitting. It
coincides, however, with a fairly consistent result of such regressions,
including those in table 4 of this paper.  That is that coordination of wage
negotiations appears to reduce the effect of macroeconomic shocks on
unemployment. In the Netherlands, coordination came too late to avoid the
increase in unemployment. (Perhaps things had to get very bad in order
to trigger such coordination.) But coordination has played a central role
in the decline in unemployment.
Christopher A. Sims: This paper takes the stance that unemployment
arises from the interaction of the dynamic decisions of workers and firms,
and that for both of them these decisions have the nature of investment
problems and interact with other dynamic problems, such as saving and
investment in physical capital.
I am sympathetic with this stance. Some of its implications are recog-
nized and pursued in the paper, even motivate the paper. The paper empha-
sizes that changes in interest rates, productivity of capital, productivity of
workers, population growth, age distribution of the population, laws reg-
ulating labor markets, and prices of capital goods could all be important
influences on the unemployment rate.
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But the paper’s viewpoint carries other implications that are not so
well reflected in the paper. The paper’s viewpoint suggests that unem-
ployment need not be monotonically related to welfare and efficiency. As
elaborated in Phelps’s book Structural Slumps, there are several versions
of the theory, all of which imply that there is no reason to expect labor
market outcomes automatically to be optimal.1 But workers can search
for new jobs and firms can invest in training new employees with too much
or too little intensity, and their intensity influences the unemployment rate.
One can imagine an economy in which innovation is held back by poli-
cies that encourage low unemployment rates and low wages. Indeed, there
are policies that one expects could keep unemployment low at the expense
of cumulating misallocations of labor, so that they generate low current
unemployment at the cost of higher future unemployment. The paper dis-
regards these possibilities. It would have been interesting to see some
accounting for possible two-way feedback between output per working-
age person and the unemployment rate, both in the descriptive statistical
analysis and in the theoretical discussion. The paper’s apparent presump-
tion that more unemployment is always worse may easily be correct, but
it is not obviously correct.
The dynamic theory underlying the paper is inherently multivariate
and interactive, with multiple potential sources of change in the unem-
ployment rate. Decisions by firms, reacting to technological change and
shifts in demand, can change unemployment. The same is true for deci-
sions by workers, reflecting changes in the age composition and educa-
tion of the work force and expectations about the future value of implicit
wage contracts. Government labor market regulations are an independent
source of variation, as are product market regulations, antitrust policy,
and trade policy. Sorting out these potential sources of influence to
“explain” variations in the observed unemployment rate is a challenging
task, and the paper does not face up well to the challenge.
The paper’s story about the data is as follows: that a “base” regression
equation that in some sense represents the paper’s theory worked to 
explain unemployment over 1960–98; that this equation shows the inter-
action of variables measuring labor market sclerosis with real macroeco-
nomic variables suggested by the paper’s theory; and that the regression
results show only a modest role for monetary, as opposed to this paper’s
dynamic real, influences on unemployment. These results simply update to
1. Phelps (1994).
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the 1990s work done by Phelps and others earlier. The story goes on to
claim that the changes from the 1980s to the 1990s are not well accounted
for by the previous empirical formulations, and that the introduction of
stock price indices as explanatory variables corrects this problem. This
result is taken as evidence in favor of the type of theory of unemployment
presented in this paper and in Phelps’s previous work.
Although this story about the data could be true, it is not very well sup-
ported, for three reasons. Most important, the paper’s strategy of letting
competing theories be represented informally by variables on the right-
hand side of single-equation regressions relies on some implicit assump-
tions and theorizing that would be hard to maintain were they made 
explicit. The competing theories here are, roughly speaking, a monetary 
theory, a theory based on labor market institutions, and a productivity 
theory. None of these theories suggests a single-equation regression as a 
test bed for the theory. Analysis of the effects of monetary policy now 
routinely accepts the importance of endogenous reactions of monetary pol-
icy to economic disturbances, so that no single variable has a claim to even
approximately represent monetary policy. This paper represents monetary
policy, and all other nominal demand effects on unemployment, by putting
inflation rates or differences of inflation rates on the right-hand side of
regressions. Serious modern theories of the effects of monetary policy
would not suggest that this is a good measure. And they would suggest that
many of the other variables on the right-hand side of the paper’s regression
equation, including stock prices, would be sensitive to monetary policy.
The representation of labor market institutions is more complex, but
subject to the same sort of objection. A set of institutional and labor mar-
ket policy variables used by previous researchers is introduced and 
allowed to enter the basic regression as an interaction with “macro” vari-
ables, so that the equation is nonlinear. (We are presented the results in two
linear regressions, layered on top of each other, so that the statistics asso-
ciated with the results are hard to interpret.) Surely labor market institu-
tions affect firm profitability, and hence the stock market. Given that the
measures we have of labor market flexibility are quite imperfect, it does
not make sense to take evidence that stock prices have explanatory power
in regressions as evidence for the productivity theory and against the insti-
tutional theories.
The general point here is that it is well known that stock prices, like any
auction-market asset prices, respond quickly to new information of all
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sorts. Almost any dynamic, stochastic theory of the economy is therefore
likely to imply that stock prices have predictive power for almost any
important macroeconomic variable. Finding significant coefficients on
stock prices in a regression explaining macroeconomic variables there-
fore hardly ever has much value in discriminating among competing
theories, and this paper is no exception.
The paper does not document very well its claim that there was some-
thing special about the transition from the 1980s to the 1990s that previous
empirical specifications cannot account for. The paper’s table 5 does show
that the paper’s base regression, fit through 1991, does not forecast very
well seven years ahead. But this is a dynamic regression with a fairly large
coefficient on lagged unemployment. It is quite possible that once we took
account of that, and of the fact that the coefficients of the regression are esti-
mated with error, the size of these forecast errors would be unsurprising.
The paper also shows that when the variables in the base specification are
used, grouped in a few separate regressions, to explain changes in unem-
ployment from the 1980s to the 1990s, the R2s are in some (but not all) cases
low, and many coefficients are insignificant. But no evidence is presented that
this pattern of low R2s and insignificant coefficients in predicting cross-
decade changes is new to the 1990s, or that it implies any deterioration in
the fit of the original panel data specification of the paper’s table 1.
When stock prices are added to the regressions, they certainly enter sig-
nificantly, but this is true both in the basic specification (table 1) for
1960–98 and in the regressions explaining the 1980s versus the 1990s. It
appears to me that the most reasonable conclusion is that stock prices have
long been correlated with changes in unemployment. Certainly some
changes in unemployment in the 1990s have been hard to predict, but
whether this situation is really different from what has been seen in pre-
vious decades remains unclear. And, for the reasons already summarized
above, the evidence presented here, particularly the evidence on correla-
tions with stock prices, does little to help us distinguish competing theo-
ries of the evolution of unemployment.
The level and persistence of unemployment rates around the world
remain poorly accounted for by standard macroeconomic theories. The
type of thinking represented by this paper’s theory is a good start toward
a more useful theory. But bringing this kind of theory into useful contact
with the data will require more attention to the link between behavioral
theory and econometric specification.
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General discussion: Benjamin Friedman observed that the relationship in
the authors’ model among the three classes of firms’ assets—trained work-
ers, the customer base, and tangible assets—was bound to be a complicated
one, possibly involving unequal returns across assets along the adjustment
path to a steady state. Even if firms aim to equalize the returns to each
asset in equilibrium, they still might be expected to invest in each along dif-
ferent paths, depending on the relation between the speed and the costs of
adjustment. Thus the formal model’s equilibrium would not necessarily
support the idea that firms respond to a favorable shock to productivity
growth by adding labor at exactly the same speed as they add to their fixed
capital. 
Kevin Stiroh observed that the correlation of total factor productivity
growth and capital shallowing in some of the countries discussed by Olivier
Blanchard in his comment might be a measurement error arising from the
lack of quality adjustments to price indexes for high-technology capital
goods. Without the kinds of quality adjustments made to U.S. data, real
equipment investment would be underestimated and total factor productiv-
ity growth correspondingly overestimated. Blanchard responded that he
was uncertain about the quality corrections in the data for individual coun-
tries, but he reiterated that the available data show capital shallowing in
OECD countries in which unemployment has decreased, and capital deep-
ening in countries in which unemployment has increased.
William Nordhaus welcomed the paper’s attempt to explore aggregate
demand effects  but suggested that such an exploration might have use-
fully gone beyond the analysis of monetary policy that the authors report.
An analysis of primary structural surpluses and country-specific export
demands would be informative. And although the authors report that a
dummy variable for a country staying in the European monetary system
during the 1990s was not significant in explaining unemployment, a more
careful assessment of exchange rate policy might detect some effect. Nord-
haus also noted that stock markets would be expected to exert significant
aggregate demand effects through consumption, quite apart from their pos-
sible influence through the investment channel, which the paper empha-
sized. He agreed with Christopher Sims’ comment that a correlation of
anything with stock market returns is hard to interpret causally because
the market is potentially responsive to any shock.
Shang-Jin Wei observed that, important though it is to investigate the
impact of institutions on unemployment, there is often little variation in
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the data on which to base an analysis, as the authors had found. He noted
that recent examples of large institutional change that had not been
exploited by researchers were the introduction of a thirty-five-hour work-
week in France, and China’s move to a five-day workweek last year. He
suggested that these changes, and earlier ones like the move from a six- to
a five-day workweek in the European countries, might provide informa-
tion on the impact of such changes on unemployment and on the interac-
tions between institutions and shocks.
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